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Abstract

Through out the world, new techniques are developed to test and evaluate systems.
The Department of Defense and the US Air Force conduct numerous studies into the
reliability and maintainability of current and future weapons systems in an effort to
understand the reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) performance of these
systems. Furthermore, they must verify RM&A characteristics of systems, which are still in
the development phase. The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) is
responsible for testing new equipment to ensure their RM&A characteristics meet
specifications.
Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational Readiness (RAPTOR) is the
software tool developed by HQ AFOTEC to enhance existing analysis capabilities. RAPTOR
is a modeling framework allowing quick creation of RM&A models for many systems.
DoD has made verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of these simulation
models an official requirement. This research outlines a generic VV&A plan that uses the
appropriate tools and techniques to perform model verification, validation, and accreditation.
This plan is then applied to RAPTOR 5.0 and a portion of verification and validation of
RAPTOR is completed and recommendations for accreditation are made.

x

A VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION ASSESSMENT OF
RAPID AVAILABILITY PROTOTYPING FOR TESTING
OPERATIONAL READINESS

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview
Through out the world, new techniques are developed to test and evaluate
systems. The Department of Defense and the US Air Force conduct numerous studies
into the reliability and maintainability of current and future weapons systems in an effort
to understand the reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) costs of these
systems. Furthermore, they must verify RM&A characteristics of systems, which are still
in the development phase. The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
(AFOTEC) is responsible for testing new equipment to ensure their RM&A
characteristics meet specifications. AFOTEC also manages a large portion of the Air
Force's weapon systems operational verification, validation, and testing.
There are many circumstances that prevent AFOTEC or other users (civilian or
military) to completely test equipment or weapon systems before acquisition. There are
some constraints that organizations cannot ignore. Two of these constraints are time and
cost. Compounding these constraints are systems, which have very long reliability
requirements or are very expensive to test. It is difficult to test a system that has an
expected life of decades. The equipment would often be obsolete before the test was
complete. Other systems may be very costly and require destructive testing. Testing
1

hundreds of ballistic missiles in order to figure out their reliability is impractical because
they are both too expensive and very lethal. These kinds of limiting factors are driving
organizations to search for alternative ways to complete test and evaluation of new
equipment. One of these alternative ways is simulation modeling which can be an easier
way for predicting the system performance. However, a simulation model must go
through the verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) process before it can be
used by the Air Force. The objective of this effort is to perform a portion of verification
and validation of RAPTOR, in addition to creating a generic VV&A plan that can be
applied to most simulation models.
Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational Readiness (RAPTOR) is the
software tool developed by HQ AFOTEC to enhance existing analysis capabilities.
RAPTOR is a modeling framework allowing quick creation of RM&A models for almost
any system. RAPTOR is primarily intended to be used by HQ AFOTEC analysts in
support of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). Since RAPTOR is so easy to use,
there has been an explosion of requests from academic institutions for the tool. As stated
in their web site, more than 300 commercial and government organizations also have
copies of this tool [9]. RAPTOR has many advantages:
1. Allows rapid creation of reliability and availability models for any system.
2. Reduces the time required to complete a reliability and availability model from
months to minutes by combining all the common elements of reliability modeling and
simulation.
3. Increases modeling productivity by 99%.

4. Eliminates the need for manual calculation of reliability and availability of
complex systems.
RAPTOR is a powerful and user-friendly model, which makes it very easy to
quickly model a system. The graphical user interface and strong emphasis on human
factors make RAPTOR a very effective reliability analysis tool.

1.2 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability
Reliability, maintainability, and availability are concerned with a system's
dependability and reparability under continued use. The definition for reliability is the
probability that when operating under stated environmental conditions, the system will
perform its intended function adequately for a specified time. Maintainability is defined
as the probability that a failed system can be made operable in a specified interval of
down time. Availability is defined as the probability that a system is operating
satisfactorily at any point in time and is a measure of the ratio of the operating time of the
system to the operating time plus the downtime [2]. These issues are becoming very
important factors for product improvement. Companies try to impress the would-be
clients by focusing on the RM&A of their products as a means of improving their
competitiveness. In addition, RM&A analysis plays an integral part in the design and
production of efficient, cost-effective systems.
Reliability is a very fast growing and important field in consumer and capital
goods industries, in space and defense industries, and in NASA and DoD agencies.
Reliability provides the theoretical and practical tools to evaluate the capability of parts,
components, products, and systems to perform their required functions. They must

perform a specific function in a specified environment for a given period of time without
failure.
Reliability is analyzed early in product development. Analysts use analytical
methods or simulation models to represent the RM&A aspects of their systems. As
systems become more complex, analytical methods cannot be used. Reliability
simulation offers an alternative path for early prediction of system performance. By
using reliability analysis, design alternatives can be tested before production and the best
option can be selected along with removing or improving identified design problems.

1.3 W&A Issues
Validation, verification, and accreditation (VV&A), in general terms, is a process
of review, analysis, testing and approving of simulation models developed for a specific
purpose. It is a methodology, which helps ensure the production of quality simulation
results.
VV&A is commonly used as a single expression; this is not to infer that the
methodology is an all or nothing process. The objective of VV&A is to ensure the
correctness, and consistency of the final product. VV&A may be performed by an
independent agent, a VV&A-team, by the person(s) producing the product, or a
combination of all. Model VV&A focuses on the prevention and the detection of errors,
i.e. deviation from intent. This is accomplished using both manual and automated
techniques. Errors include deficiencies such as unsatisfied requirements, the inclusion of
extraneous functions, or using incorrect solution algorithms. An error may be in the
coding of the model, the specification of the model, or the documentation. The error

might be related to the functional correctness or another property, such as performance,
or a more subjective attribute such as product quality.
The motivation of testing a simulation model is to affirm model accuracy with
methods that can be economically and effectively applied to both large scale and smallscale systems. One validation and verification approach does not fit all sizes of
simulation projects. Different size simulation projects require different structures,
different personnel, and different methodologies. A small project may only require a
single analyst to obtain usable results, while a large project with various quality attributes
may require several groups of analysts with different skills.

1.4 Problem Statement
Reliability simulation offers an easier path for evaluating RM&A characteristics
of increasingly complex systems. The decisions being made with the simulation model
are of particular importance. One of the most difficult problems facing a simulation
analyst is that of trying to determine whether a simulation model is an accurate
representation of the actual system being studied, i.e. whether the model is valid. In
addition, the simulation model must be accredited by the using organization. Therefore,
verification, validation, and accreditation process is critical to product evaluation and the
final evaluation of the system.
As these systems advance so must the reliability, maintainability, and availability
analysis capability. The industrial community and the Air Force continue to use
simulation methods for handling RM&A analysis. AFOTEC depends on RAPTOR to
evaluate new Air Force systems. They are also depending on the upgrade of RAPTOR as

a valid simulation program. The Air Force currently uses RAPTOR 2.0 to provide
RM&A analysis on new equipment acquisitions. This model was verified, validated,
accredited on 30 January 1996, however its capabilities are limited, and new systems
require enhanced capabilities.
RAPTOR 5.0 is an enhanced simulation model, which is intended to replace
RAPTOR 2.0. This change, however, requires RAPTOR 5.0 to be verified, validated,
and accredited in accordance with DoD and Air Force Instructions. A generic VV&A
plan must be developed and applied to RAPTOR. This research will:
1. Explore VV&A in the literature to gain more knowledge about the VV&A
techniques and policies that are currently used.
2. AFI16-1001 identifies the verification and validation agent's responsibility to
develop a VV&A plan [10]. A generic plan will be developed that can be used
for future VV&A purposes. This plan will be based on the Air Force Instruction
and the insight provided by the literature review.
3. Perform a partial verification and validation of RAPTOR simulation model by
applying appropriate portions of this VV&A plan and provide recommendations
for accreditation.

1.5 Thesis Outline
The objective of this thesis effort is to outline a generic VV&A plan that uses the
appropriate tools and techniques to perform model verification, validation, and
accreditation. This plan will be applied to RAPTOR 5.0 and a portion of verification and
validation of RAPTOR will be completed and recommendations for accreditation will be

made. This thesis is organized into chapters according to subject areas. Chapter 2
presents a background on VV&A issues, an overview of RM&A, and an introduction to
RAPTOR. Chapter 3 presents a generic VV&A plan, tools and techniques for
verification, validation, and accreditation of simulation models. Chapter 4 will apply the
VV&A structure provided in Chapter 3 to the RAPTOR model. The partial RAPTOR
verification and validation will be completed and documented according to the test plan.
Recommendations for accreditation will be given but an overall and complete VV&A is
outside the scope of this effort. Chapter 5 represents the conclusions of this thesis,
recommendations for improving RAPTOR and areas for future study.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability Overview
Reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) analysis form the
foundation of the reliability engineering field. New and advanced studies continue to be
an important area of research. Improved methods like reliability simulation provide
analysts a technique for handling system evaluations easily in the area of reliability.
The evolution of reliability started with the mechanical systems. As the electrical
systems started to be widely used after the first quarter of the twentieth century, the
importance of reliability started to increase. At the early stages the reliability of the
electrical systems was improved by simply adding redundant components and wiring.
World War II, Korea, and the Vietnam War changed the military focus to weapon
systems reliability. The explosion in electronics after the 1950s made reliability a valued
branch of engineering. With the use of new and widely applied techniques in reliability,
it became a part of the total quality initiatives of companies trying to gain a competitive
edge.
Kececioglu states that reliability has the following objectives [2]:
1. Determine if the performance of components, equipment, and systems is within
specifications for the desired function period. If it is not, find out whether it is the
result of a malfunction or of a failure, which requires corrective action.
2. Determine the pattern of the failures, causes, and time to failure distributions.
8

3. Determine the failure rate, the mean life, the reliability of components,
equipment, and systems, and their associated confidence limits at some desired
confidence levels.
4. Based on the results obtained, provide guidelines for corrective actions that
should be taken.
5. Reevaluate the performance of the units after corrective actions taken to assure
that these actions were the correct ones and as effective as intended.
6. Determine the growth in the mean life and the reliability of units during their
research, engineering, and development phase.
7. Provide a means to statistically and scientifically determine if a redesign has
indeed improved the failure rate, mean life or reliability of components or
equipment with the desired confidence.
8. Provide a statistical and scientific means to determine which one of the two
manufacturers of a component or equipment or design should be preferred from
the failure rate, mean life or reliability point of view while all other factors being
practically and economically the same.
9. Select the best reliability test from the point of view of the test time, risk levels,
number of equipment, cost, and personnel available to demonstrate the specified
or desired failure rate, mean life or reliability at the chosen confidence level.
10. Provide management with the reliability test results, as requested by them,
and in the format that will convey the requested information in a very easily
understood form so they can make the right decision.

If systems are simple or not very complicated in size, they can be evaluated by
using analytical methods. However, these methods are limited and cumbersome if the
systems become more complex and larger in size.

2.2 Analysis Techniques
2.2.1 Analytical Solutions
Systems are generally broken down into sub-systems of components for RM&A
analysis. There are several categories of component systems. The common ones include
series, parallel, series-parallel, and complex systems. The simple example of a series
system contains two components as shown in Figure 1.

1

2

—

Figure 1. Series System
The reliability of a component (p) ranges from 0 to 1. Given the reliabilities of
the two components arepi andp2 respectively and the assumption of independently
operating components, then the system reliability function hip) for the series system is:
h(p)=pl*p2

(2.1)

A two component parallel system is shown in Figure 2.

1

Figure 2. Parallel System
10

In a parallel system the reliability function is:
h(p)=l-[(l-Pl)*(l-p2)]

(2.2)

Series-parallel systems consist of combinations of series and parallel components
in the system.
1

Figure 3. Series-Parallel System
The reliability function for this system is:
h{p) = [1- (l-Pl) * (l-p2)] *p3 * [1- (l-p4) * (l-p5)]

(2.3)

An example for complex structure can be shown with the structure in Figure 4.

'

1

3

2

4

Figure 4. Complex Structure
The system reliability function for the complex structure is:
h(p) = «Pi* Ps) + (Pi* Pd + (p2* Pi) + (Pi* Pd
- (Pi* Pi* Pi) - (Pi*Ps*pd - (P*Ps*Pi) -(p*Pi* A) + (p*Pi* Ps*PA))

(2.4)

As it can be seen from above, the complexity of the reliability function increases
as the size of the system increases. There are several analytical methods for determining
the steady-state properties of systems, including Network Theory, Markov Models, Cut
11

Sets, Venn Decomposition, and Non-Homogenous Poisson Process. Analytical methods
can directly solve many reliability systems and provide exact solutions. However, if the
complexity of the system increases, analytical solutions become cumbersome and
impractical. In these kinds of situations where analytical methods are inadequate,
simulation provides a dependable and preferable alternative. The results of simulation
models approximate system performance. Although analytical methods provide exact
solutions, a reasonable approximation through simulation is better than no solution when
analytical methods fail. As Law and Kelton state, the accuracy of the results is getting
better [13]. Although the accuracy is getting better, there is still need to improve the
modeling capability of current simulation tools to account for realistic behavior of realworld systems.

2.2.2 Simulation Analysis
Simulation analysis is an alternative to analytical models and solutions. Most of
these simulation tools are based on Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulation
makes consecutive draws from varying distributions representing the failure and repair
rates. By using these distributions, the simulation predicts the actual system
performance. Monte Carlo simulation offers a reasonable solution for determining
reliability, maintainability, and availability to complex systems when analytical methods
are inadequate. This technique applies to almost all types of systems, from simple to
complex reliability block diagram. Reliability block diagram simulation has a great
potential for predicting large-scale system reliability and availability.

12

Simulation analysis can be used in two different ways. In the first choice, the
users create their own simulation model by writing their own code. This can be a tough
choice if one does not have enough experience with a high-end simulation language.
Even if the users are capable of code writing, they still have to be sure that their model is
working correctly and they have built the right model for their needs.
The second choice is an easier approach. An analyst can use a verified and
validated simulation model. In this case, they do not have to worry about the VV&A
issues. These software products are much more user-friendly and give more flexibility
and speed to the user. Some examples of reliability simulation models are Relex, Item,
Avesim and RAPTOR.

2.3 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
Military weapon or defense systems are often large and extremely complex. They
are difficult to understand and evaluate without the help of modeling and simulation.
Discrete event and time-stepped simulations have been the foundations for the major
computer tools for analyzing combat since the 1960s. Decisions and actions involving
billions of dollars have been and will continue to be influenced by these simulations.
Realizing this, DoD has made verification, validation, and accreditation of these
simulations an official requirement [7].
According to Air Force Instruction 16-1001, verification is the process of
determining that modeling and simulation (M&S) accurately represents the developer's
conceptual description and specifications. This is accomplished by identifying and
eliminating mistakes in logic, mathematics, or programming. This process establishes
13

that the M&S code and logic correctly perform the intended functions. AFI16-1001
defines validation as the process of determining the degree to which a model is an
accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the
model [10]. Validation process can also be used to identify necessary model
improvements. Validation has two major components. The first part is structural
validation. This includes an internal examination of M&S assumptions, architecture, and
algorithms in the context. The second part is output validation, which determines how
well, the M&S results compare with the perceived real world. Accreditation is the
official determination by the accreditation authority whether or not the modeling and
simulation is acceptable for a specific purpose. This determination considers the
verification and validation status of a specific model version, its data support, and the
analyst or the users that operate the model. The accreditation authority is the individual
who is responsible and accountable for decisions or actions based upon the specific
modeling and simulation usage. The decision to accredit a model or simulation rests only
with the accreditation authority. The verification and validation documentation of model
will be reviewed in the later sections of this effort.
According to AFI 16 - 1001 the key actions and elements in Figure 5 constitute a
flexible process that accommodates VV&A activities throughout the M&S' life cycle.
Even though the Air Force and other experts in this area have their own definitions and
techniques for VV&A, there is no general VV&A plan applicable to every simulation
model.

14
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Figure 5. Air Force VV&A Process
In this effort, the objective is to come up with a new VV&A plan, which can be
applied to general modeling and simulation that can be used by the Air Force. The
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foundation of this plan will be situated over the Air Force VV&A process, but it would
also be applicable to models used outside the Air Force.
The first part of Figure 5 shows the steps accomplished during the development
phase of the model. The second part introduces the W&A effort accomplished by the
agent using the VV&A plan. The agent should follow some rules and principles during
this process.
Verification and validation are based on certain underlying principles. According
to the Webster's dictionary, a principle is defined as:
1. An accepted or professed rule of action or conduct. 2. A fundamental,
primary or general laws or truth from which others is derived. 3. A fundamental
doctrine or tenet; a distinctive ruling opinion.
Understanding and applying these principles is very important for the success of a
modeling and simulation effort. Principles help the researchers, agents and managers to
better understand what validation and verification is about.
According to Balci, et al, the following principles can be helpful during the
VV&A phase of a modeling and simulation [14]:
1. Verification and validation must be conducted throughout the entire modeling
and simulation life cycle.
2. The outcome of verification and validation should not be considered as a binary
variable, meaning the model or the simulation is absolutely correct or absolutely
incorrect.
3. A simulation model is built with respect to the modeling and simulation
objectives and its credibility should be judged with respect to those objectives.
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4. Verification and validation requires independence and objectivity to prevent
developer's bias and influence.
5. Verification and validation is difficult. It is more difficult if verification and
validation does not start with the development of the model.
6. Complete simulation model testing is not possible.
7. Verification and validation must be planned and documented.
8. Errors must be prevented. (Type I, Type II, Type III)
9. Errors should be detected as early as possible in the modeling and simulation
life cycle. This prevents costs of revising the model in the later stages of
development.
10. Multiple response problems must be recognized and resolved properly.
11. Successful testing of each module does not imply overall model credibility.
The interaction between the modules must also be tested.
12. Simulation model validity does not guarantee the credibility and acceptability
of simulation results.
13. A well-formulated problem is essential to the acceptability and accreditation
of modeling and simulation results.
Verification and validation is not a phase or step in the modeling and simulation
life cycle, but a continuous activity throughout the entire life cycle as announced in
principle 1. Conducting VV&A for the first time at the end of the M&S application life
cycle would be like a teacher who only gives a final examination. The student does not
know if she or he has any deficiencies until the course is complete. Frequent tests and

17

homework through the quarter notifies the student about his or her deficiencies so they
can study more and improve their knowledge about the course.
The situation in conducting verification and validation is similar to this example.
VV&A activities throughout the entire M&S life cycle are intended to highlight any
quality deficiencies. This helps the researchers early on to improve the product during
the life cycle. Errors are detected as early as possible. Delaying verification and
validation to later stages increases the possibility of making Type I and Type II errors.
Type I error is done when the model is rejected even though the model is valid. Type II
error is made when the model is accepted even though the model is not valid.

2.4 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Process
Three basic approaches are used in deciding if a simulation model is credible or
not. Each of the approaches requires the model development team to conduct verification
and validation as a part of the model development process. The most common approach
is to have the development team make the accreditation decision. This is a subjective
decision based on the results of the various tests and evaluations conducted as a part of
the model development process.
Another approach is independent verification and validation (IV&V), which uses
a third party to decide whether the model is credible. The third party is independent of
both the model development team and the model sponsor. After the model is developed,
the third party conducts an evaluation to determine its credibility. Based upon this
evaluation, the third party makes a subjective decision on the accreditation of the model.

18

This approach is usually used when a large cost is associated with the problem requiring
the simulation model.
The IV&V approach ranges from simply reviewing the verification and validation
conducted by the model development team to a complete verification and validation
effort. A complete IV&V evaluation is extremely costly and time consuming. If a
decision is made to use IV&V, it should be early in the model development process. This
decision would significantly decrease the cost of VV&A. If the model has already been
developed, the IV&V agent should only evaluate the verification and validation that has
already been performed before. Starting the VV&A process after the model has been
developed would be very time consuming and this again increases the cost.
The last approach to determine model validity is to use a scoring technique.
Scores or weights are determined subjectively during the validation process. Then they
are combined to determine the category scores and the overall score for the simulation
model. A simulation model is considered valid if its overall and category scores are
greater than a certain predetermined score.
Sargent thinks that this approach is impractical due to the subjective passing
scores. In addition, the model may receive a passing score but it may still have a
deficiency that needs to be corrected [15]. These are the three main approaches that are
used. We should also understand how model verification and validation relate to the
model development process. A simple model development process can be used as an
example like in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Simplified Version of the Modeling Process

The problem entity in Figure 6 is the system or the idea to be modeled. The
conceptual model is the mathematical or logical representation of the problem entity.
The computerized model is the conceptual model implemented on a computer.
Conceptual model validity is defined as determining that the theories and
assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct and the model representation of
the problem entity is reasonable for the intended purpose of the model. Computerized
model verification is defined as ensuring that the computer programming and
implementation of the conceptual model is correct. Operational validity is defined as
determining that the model's output behavior has sufficient accuracy for the model's
intended purpose over the domain of the model's intended applicability. Data validity is
defined as ensuring that the data necessary for model building, model evaluation and
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testing, and conducting the model experiments to solve the problem are adequate and
correct [15].

2.4.1 Verification
According to DoD directive 5000.59, verification is the process of determining
that a model implementation accurately represents the developer's conceptual description
and specifications [22]. In more general terms, verification is usually an iterative process
that determines if a model and its resultant simulation accurately represents both what is
required and what the modeling and simulation developer said would be built in
accordance with those requirements. Verification ensures that the modeling and
simulation will have more complete requirements, a better defined conceptual model, a
more thorough and correct design, and cleaner implementation with fewer operational
bugs. Since fewer things are left to chance, this means lower development risk, easier
use and maintenance and a more satisfied user.
In general, computerized model verification ensures that the computer
programming and implementation of the conceptual model are correct. The type of
computer language used affects the probability of having a correct model program. The
use of a special purpose simulation language generally will result in having fewer errors
than using a general-purpose simulation language.
After the computer program has been developed, implemented and programming
bugs removed, the program must be tested for correctness and accuracy. First, the
simulation functions should be tested to see if they are correct. Straightforward tests can
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be used here to determine if they are working properly. Next, each sub-model and the
overall model should be tested to see if they are correct.
According to Sargent, there are two basic approaches to testing, static and
dynamic testing [15]. In static testing, the computer program of the computerized model
is analyzed to determine if it is correct by using techniques such as correctness proof,
structured walk-through and examining the structure properties of the program. In
dynamic testing the computerized model is executed under different conditions and the
results are used to determine if the computer program and its implementations are correct.
This includes both the values obtained during the program execution and the final values.
There are three different strategies used in dynamic testing. The first one is the bottomup testing, which means testing the sub-models first and then the overall model. Second
one is top-down testing, which means testing the overall model first and then testing the
sub-models. Third one is mixed testing. Mixed testing uses a combination of bottom-up
and top-down testing.
The techniques commonly used in dynamic testing are traces, investigations of
input- output relations, internal consistency checks, and reprogramming critical
components to determine if the same results are obtained. We have to be careful while
checking the correctness of the computer program and its implementation because the
data, the conceptual model, the computer program or the computer implementation may
cause errors.
According to Whitner and Balci, the verification effort should at least include the
following requirements for it to be complete [21]:
1. Identification of the verification agent.
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2. A description of the model or simulation version or release and developing
organization.
3. Complete identification and description of the verification methodologies and
activities, organizations, and individuals involved in the verification process from
the beginning.
4. Results of the verification effort, including any identified modeling and
simulation limitations.

2.4.2 Validation
Validation can be divided into different categories. Youngblood and Pace present
two categories of validation methods [11]. First one is the conceptual model validation.
The other one is implementation validation method. Conceptual validation is the review
of assumptions, algorithms, modeling concepts, data availability, and architecture of the
conceptual model. This determines if the model is expected to provide an acceptable
representation of the subject for the intended application. Implementation (results)
validation is the review process that compares model responses to known or expected
behavior to determine that the responses are sufficiently accurate for the intended uses.
Ketanni and Oral divide validation into four parts, structural, experimental
(results), operational, and data validation [12]. Structural validation's core concern is the
degree of assumption and theoretical relevance underlying the formal model of the real
world event. Experimental validation is concerned with the quality of solutions, the types
of solutions, the nature of solution techniques, and the efficiency of solution procedures.
Operational validation refers to the usability, usefulness, timeliness, and cost of
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implementation of the model's recommended decision. Data validation involves the
sufficiency, accuracy, appropriateness, availability, maintainability, reliability, and the
cost of the data. Experimental validation is outside the scope of this effort because we
are not evaluating the quality of the solutions. Other validation categories are explained
in depth in the following section.

2.4.2.1 Conceptual, Operational, and Data Validation
Conceptual model validity can be defined as determining that the theories and
assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct and the model representation of
the problem entity and the model's structure, logic, and mathematical relationships are
reasonable for the intended purpose of the model. The theories and assumptions should
be tested using mathematical analysis and statistical methods on problem entity data.
Examples of assumptions are linearity and independence.
Next, each sub-model and the overall model must be evaluated to determine if
they are reasonable and correct for the intended purpose of the model. Face validation
techniques can be used at this point. If errors are found in the conceptual model, it must
be revised and conceptual model validation should be performed again.
Operational validity is concerned with determining that the model's output
behavior has the accuracy required for the model's intended purpose. This is where most
of the validation testing and evaluation takes place. The computerized model is used in
operational validity. And thus, any deficiencies found may be due to an inadequate
conceptual model, an improperly programmed or implemented conceptual model or due
to invalid data.
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All of the validation techniques are applicable to operational validity. Which
techniques and whether to use them objectively or subjectively must be decided by the
model development team or the VV&A agent.
Even though data validity is usually not considered to be part of the model
validation, it is very important. Data limitations are often the reason why attempts to
validate a model fail due to inaccurate data resulting in incorrect outputs in the model.
Generally, data are needed for three purposes: for building the conceptual model, for
validating the model, and for performing experiments with the validated model. In the
case of model validation, the agent needs conceptual data and data for validating the
model of the intended purpose. This data can be difficult, time consuming, and costly to
obtain.
To build a conceptual model we must have sufficient data on the problem entity
to develop theories. These theories are used in building the model, to develop the
mathematical and logical relationships in the model. In addition to this, behavioral data
is needed on the problem entity to be used in the operational validity step. If these data
are not available, high model confidence usually cannot be obtained, because sufficient
operational validity cannot be achieved.
As mentioned earlier it is difficult, time consuming and costly to obtain accurate
and appropriate data. Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done to ensure that the
data are correct. The best that can be done is to develop good procedures for collecting
and maintaining data. Test the collected data and screen for outliers and determine if
they are correct. If the amount of data is large, a database should be developed and
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maintained. If data are not available, high model confidence cannot be obtained. This
situation directly impacts the credibility and the accreditation of the model.

2.4.2.2 Validation Techniques
The validation techniques can be used either subjectively or objectively.
Generally, combinations of techniques are used for validating the sub-models and the
overall model. According to Sargent, et al, all or some of the techniques can be used
during the validation process [15]:
Animation: The model's operational behavior is displayed graphically as the
model moves through time. The users can see the dynamic displays of the simulated
system. These displays can be pictures, drawings, geometric shapes or even cartoons.
Since the users are familiar with the real system, they can detect programming and
conceptual errors.
Comparison to Other Models: Outputs of the simulation model are compared to
the results of other valid models. The VV&A agent should make sure that; a credible
authority has validated the other model. A credible model helps to increase the
credibility and chance of accreditation of the model at hand. After the comparison is
made, the results from both models should be evaluated by using graphical or statistical
analysis techniques.
Degenerate Tests: The degeneracy of the model's behavior is tested by
appropriate selection of values of the input and internal parameters. For example, does
the average number in the queue of a single server continue to increase with respect to
time when the arrival rate is larger than the service rate?
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Event Validity: The events of occurrences of the simulation model are compared
to those of the real system to determine if they are similar. For example, in a hospital
simulation, deaths are inevitable occurrences when human beings are considered.
Therefore the hospital simulation should generate deaths at the appropriate rate.
Extreme Condition Tests: The model structure and output should be plausible for
any extreme or unlikely combination of factor levels in the system. This helps the user to
identify that the model is operable in every region within its defined domain. An
example for this case may be, if the process inventories are zero, then the production
output should also be zero.
Face Validity: Face validity is asking people who are knowledgeable about the
system if the model and its behavior are reasonable. These people should be subject
matter experts. This technique can be used determining if the logic in the conceptual
model is correct and if a model's input and output relationships are reasonable.
Fixed Values: Constants are used for various model input and internal variables
and parameters. This allows the checking of model results against easily calculated
values or analytical solutions. The results can also be checked with real life data if there
is enough information about the real system.
Historical Data Validation: A portion of the historical data (or data collected on a
system for building or testing the model), is used to build the model and the remaining
part is used to test if the model behaves as the system does. This testing can be
conducted by populating the simulation model with either sample from historical
distributions or traces.
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Historical Methods: There are three historical methods of validation; rationalism,
empiricism, and positive economics. Rationalism assumes that everyone knows whether
the underlying assumptions of the model are true. Logic deductions are used from these
assumptions to develop the correct or valid model. Empiricism requires every
assumption and outcome to be empirically validated. Positive economics requires only
that the model be able to predict the future and is not concerned with a model's
assumptions or structure. This can also be explained as casual relationship or mechanism
theory.
Internal Validity: Several replications of a model are made to determine the
amount of internal variability in the model. A high amount of variability, which is a sign
of lack of consistency, may cause the model's results to be suspect and may also question
the appropriateness of the policy or system being investigated.
Operational Graphics: Values of various performance measures may be shown
graphically as the model moves through time. For example, the performance measure
might be number of customers in a queue or percentage of servers busy and the dynamic
behavior of them are visually displayed as the simulation model is running.
Parameter Variability-Sensitivity Analysis: This technique consists of changing
the values of the input and internal parameters of a model to determine the effect upon
the model's behavior and its output. The same relationship should occur in the model as
in the real system. Those parameters that are sensitive, i.e., cause significant changes in
the model's behavior or output, should be made sufficiently accurate prior to using the
model.
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Predictive Validation: The model is used to predict the system behavior and then
comparisons are made between the system's behavior and the model's forecast to
determine if they are the same. The system data may come from an operational system or
from experiments performed on the system. An example for these is the field tests,
which are common for military systems.
Traces: The behavior of different types of specific entities in the model is
followed through the model to determine if the model's logic is correct and if the
necessary accuracy is obtained.
Turing Tests: People who are knowledgeable about the operations of a system are
asked if they can discriminate between system and model outputs. In other words, they
compare performance of the system against that of an expert in the blind trials.

2.4.3 Accreditation
Model accreditation is specified for a particular modeling and simulation use or
application. The accreditation decision evaluates the appropriateness of a particular
model for a specific application. The verification and validation data provide the
decision-maker with a basis for accepting the simulation outputs and integrating the
results into the decision process. The accreditation decision documents the acceptance of
the simulation results to support a specific test report. A model may require multiple
accreditations to support different categories of uses and different configurations.
The modeling and simulation application is defined by the system to be simulated,
the key variables to be studied, the test measures of interest, and the data collection
requirements for the simulation. The definition of the system must identify the key
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features of the system or environment that the model represents. A decision maker's
comfort in the simulation results depends on the quality of the simulation outputs, the
applicability of the simulation test results to the test measures, and the correspondence of
the model components to the real world problem. This application specific information
may not be recognizable from the verification and validation reports, but is essential to
the accreditation decision.
The model developers have a complete understanding of the assumptions and
limitations of their models, however, they may not have the same level of understanding
of the intended application. Accreditation combines the application specific information
with the model capabilities to evaluate the credibility of the model. Building model
credibility is a continuous and iterative process. The first step extends from verification
and validation to documenting the model status and capabilities. The second step is
application specific and needs to be reviewed with each model use. The heart of the
accreditation decision is the transfer of the model developer's confidence and
understanding to the model user.

2.5 RAPTOR Overview
RAPTOR is a modeling framework developed by HQ AFOTEC to enhance
existing analysis capabilities. It allows for quick creation of reliability, maintainability,
and availability models for almost any system. The user model their systems graphically
by drawing reliability block diagrams (RBD) and answering questions about the way
components fail and are repaired. These component failure and repair rates can then be
simulated to determine RM&A characteristic of the overall system.
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A reliability block diagram is a graphical and mathematical representation of the
relationships between a system's components (blocks) and their effect on the resulting
system readiness level. RAPTOR uses RBDs as a foundation for simulation. Random
numbers are drawn from the failure and repair distributions of each component, and then
these failure and repair times are scheduled against a simulation clock. By flowing time
through the system while failing and repairing each component, RAPTOR determines
behavior of the overall system, such as its availability. A simple example of RBD is
shown in Figure 7.

oo
n4

Engine 2

End

Hyd.2

Figure 7. Sample RBD
Figure 7 shows a simple aircraft system. The aircraft has two engines and two
hydraulic systems that work independently and at the same time. If one of the engines or
the hydraulic systems does not function, the overall system is degraded but still
functioning. This assumes node 2 and node 4 are defined as lA nodes, which implies the
system works as long as 1 out of 2 of the parallel components are working properly. If
one of the other systems is not functioning then the overall system is not mission capable.
RAPTOR allows long-term analysis of reliability, maintainability, and availability
performance as well as mission-based scenarios with specified time duration. It
graphically depicts the changing conditions of the system, allowing the users to visually
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examine the operating system during simulation [8]. This feature enhances model
building, validation, and presentation capabilities. RAPTOR provides one of the most
realistic representations of real world modeling in the field of reliability simulation.
2.6 Summary
The life cycle application of verification, validation, and accreditation is
extremely important for successful completion of complex and large-scale modeling and
simulation efforts. Applying the VV&A techniques throughout the life cycle of a model
is time consuming and costly. Because of this time constraint, verification and validation
are often sacrificed early in a modeling and simulation effort. This can impact the model
accreditation.
The following should be taken into consideration while determining which
verification and validation techniques should be selected for a particular model: model
type, simulation type, and modeling and simulation objectives.
How much to test and when to stop testing depends on the modeling and
simulation objectives. The testing should continue until sufficient confidence is achieved
in acceptability of modeling and simulation results. The level of confidence is
determined by the modeling and simulation objectives. Every new simulation project
should be evaluated separately as a new and unique challenge. It is not possible to prove
that a model is absolutely correct but proper VV&A techniques create confidence in a
model for the results to be accepted and used in decision making.
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3. Methodology
3.1 Adequate Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Plan
At the beginning of the verification, validation, and accreditation effort, the most
significant task is the development of a plan that outlines all necessary activities. The
appropriate level of planning is to identify the required verification and validation
activities in each development phase. These activities provide the necessary evidence
needed before continuing to the next phase of model building. The end result is a
collection of evidence used in the validation and accreditation process.
Effective planning depends on having a comprehensive understanding of the
development effort and what is expected from the VV&A effort. Other essential
planning factors include selecting the most effective and practical tools, techniques, and
methods to accomplish the necessary VV&A activities. A general VV&A plan should
include the following types of information:
1. Purpose and description of the VV&A application.
2. Scope of the effort and VV&A responsibilities.
3. Identification of the Project Manager, user agencies, contractors, VV&A agent
and responsibilities of each.
4. Intended use of the modeling and simulation.
5. The developer of the model (when, who etc.)
6. Accreditation agent and authority.
7. Descriptions of planned verification activities to be performed.
8. Descriptions of planned validation activities to be performed.
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9. Descriptions of planned accreditation activities to be performed.
10. VV&A report
11. Descriptions and locations of VV&A archives to support accreditation and
future reuse.
The first six steps are the general information about a model. The first step
describes why and how the verification, validation, and accreditation will be
accomplished. The second step identifies the scope of the VV&A effort. This is the
general outline of the VV&A plan and it clarifies the boundaries of the effort. The third
step identifies who the model project manager is, who is conducting the VV&A, and who
is going to use the results. Step four identifies when, how, and for what purposes the
modeling and simulation will be used. Step five identifies by whom and where the
modeling and simulation was developed. Step six identifies the accreditation agent and
the authority to accredit the model.
Up to step seven, all information can be easily gathered. In the next three sections
steps seven, eight, and nine will be extensively discussed. Step ten and eleven can be
accomplished after all other steps are accomplished and finalized.

3.2 Verification
The accuracy of transforming a problem formulation into a model specification or
the accuracy of converting a model representation from a flowchart form into an
executable computer program is evaluated in model verification. Model verification
deals with building the model right. Model verification starts with verifying the
requirements, which establish the starting point of the model. They show what the model
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is capable of or not. They should be clearly stated at the beginning of the development
process and should be consistent with each other.
The design verification is the next step in verification. This is the step where the
model is being put together. After the model is developed, then it must be checked for
errors in the code. Errors or bugs in the code will result in inaccurate results when the
model is used. Different techniques can be used at this step as long as they are effective
and useful for the purpose.
The steps of verification will be evaluated in the following order for this generic
plan:
1. Requirements Verification.
2. Design Verification.
3. Implementation (Results) Verification. (Code checking will be explained
briefly in this section.)
Animation is a general technique that can be used during the overall verification
process. This technique will also be explained.

3.2.1 Requirements Verification
Requirements verification is one of the major parts of VV&A planning. Some
requirements come from the user and the community that will be supported by the model.
Others come from the interactions among the user, model, project manager, and the
developer. These requirements specify how the developer plans to provide software and
hardware model capabilities to meet the operational needs of the user. One of the VV&A
tasks is to compare these requirements and determine the differences and disconnects
between them. As this effort takes place, the VV&A agent learns more about the model
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and this helps him to begin making up the VV&A plan. This initial effort focuses on
identifying the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of the requirement definitions.
The model requirements are the foundation of the entire model development process.
They should be established clearly from the beginning and understood by all the
participants of the development process.
During the requirements verification phase each requirement should be compared
to its source for correctness and consistency. To ensure a requirement is being
appropriately addressed in the simulation, the developers must find a way to detect or
measure it. There are two types of risks associated with requirements verification phase.
The first one is development risk, which shows the ability of the developer to implement
the requirement without compromising the capabilities or the performance. The second
one is the operational risks that are associated with using the model for its intended
purpose.
Requirement verification should be accomplished as early as possible to ensure a
proper foundation of the development process. As more detailed information becomes
available or if changes occur that effect the requirements, requirement verification may
have to be revisited throughout the development process. Any risk or uncertainty
associated with the development of a new model and risks associated with specific
VV&A tasks should be documented. Once the objectives and requirements have been
defined, a risk assessment can be conducted to identify and prioritize the developmental
and operational risks. The W&A agent then should focus on the difficult issues of
verifying individual requirements.
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3.2.2 Design Verification
During the design phase, the developers take the requirements, algorithms, and
interactions that are described in the conceptual model, and determine how to design
them to support the software application. The purpose of design verification is to ensure
that all these features are correctly and completely included in the design representations
and documentation. The VV&A agent must ensure that all requirements are correctly
traced during the design phase.
Design verification consists of different tasks. The first one is verifying the
interfaces. All interfaces should be verified to ensure that information could be passed as
needed for the intended use. Interfaces are the communication devices of the user and the
model. If correct communication cannot be established, the model will not perform its
intended purpose. The second task is about the amount of time or memory needed to
complete a critical software process. The timing and sizing requirements for different
processes should be checked to ensure that they do not interfere with the execution of the
simulation. Next the key algorithms should be examined for their accuracy and
appropriateness for the application. The algorithms are translated in to understandable
formats so the logic and the accuracy can be analyzed. This analysis may involve
rederiving the equations or evaluating the suitability of numerical techniques. It checks
that algorithms are correct, appropriate, stable, and meet all accuracy, timing, and sizing
requirements. Algorithm analysis examines the correctness of the equations and
numerical techniques, truncation and rounding effects. Each design verification task
should be documented by listing its objectives, assumptions, constraints, methods and
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results. The results must be reported to the model project manager and the user for
review and future reference.
All the tasks above rely on the products coming from the design process. These
products include the design documentation and representations, algorithms, design
reviews and walkthroughs, diagrams and drawings. The accuracy of all these products is
important for the efficient completion of the design verification.

3.2.3 Implementation Verification
At this phase both the hardware and the software are constructed, tested and the
actual data are installed and tested. Since the hardware is involved, the scope of the
VV&A effort can grow significantly because integration of the hardware is included in
the evaluation. At this point, the code should be run on static and dynamic analyzers to
identify errors and to ensure accurate execution. Then, the interfaces between the
components should be checked to ensure accurate relationships. Software connections
and assignments to hardware components should be checked for appropriateness.
If there is a special hardware involved in the system (like weapon system models,
aircraft motion simulators), the amount of verification required will significantly
increase. Developmental and operational test plans and procedures should be reviewed to
determine if they provide information needed for the VV&A effort. If possible, share the
results of the testing activities to minimize costs and increase efficiency.
During the development phase the code is checked continuously in code
walkthroughs, however an overall code check must be accomplished at the end of the
development phase. Code check is explained in depth in the next section.
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3.2.3.1 Checking the Code
After the model has been developed, implemented, and most of the bugs removed,
the program must be tested for correctness and accuracy. First, the simulation functions
should be tested to see if they are correct. Next, each sub-model and the overall model
should be tested.
There are two testing approaches- static and dynamic testing. In static testing, the
computerized model is analyzed to determine if it is correct by using correctness proofs,
examining the structure properties of the program, and walkthroughs. A walkthrough is
an informal meeting at which the program developer (or author) of a design or
programming product explains the details of the product to the other members of the
team. It is expected that the reviewing team members will assist the author in identifying
errors or suspicious areas that would probably be undetected until some later time in the
project life cycle. According to Deutsch, there are two types of walkthroughs [17].
1. Design Walkthroughs: An individual designer presents the design to other team
members by explaining the structure charts, interfaces, and file definitions. Team
members look for flaws in the design.
2. Code Walkthroughs: An individual programmer explains the structure and flow
of a small section of the code to other team members. Team members again look
for errors or bugs in the code.
Walkthroughs are intended to compensate for shortcomings in the formal design
reviews. The primary objective of a walkthrough is to find errors. The success of
walkthroughs in achieving the objective will vary depending on the team members and
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their dedication to the task. Both design and code walkthroughs increase the probability
of finding errors at an earlier time. There are also other advantages of walkthroughs:
1. Weak areas like efficiency and readability problems are illuminated.
2. The threat of a walkthrough improves the product quality of designers and
programmers.
3. Junior designers and programmers learn techniques from their senior
associates. 4. The marginal cost of conducting walkthrough is small in
comparison to the cost of fixing errors discovered later in the product life cycle.
Types of walkthroughs can be further distinguished in terms of their formality and
membership. This type of categorization is applicable to both design and code
walkthrough [17].
1. Internal continuous walkthroughs within the team environment.
2. Milestone walkthroughs that may include other attendees as well as the team
members.
Milestone walkthroughs are generally more effective. These walkthroughs are
conducted when a particular product milestone has been achieved. Inclusion of
knowledgeable participants from outside the team will help to broaden the objectivity of
the review. The participants of a milestone walkthrough would include:
1. A manager
2. The author
3. Other team members
4. The system engineer

40

The manager coordinates the walkthrough and maintains order. Most of the time
it is effective to have the system engineer present if he is the one who defined the
requirements. The author is the most important person as the walkthrough continues.
They explain the content and flow of the product to the other team members. He can use
operational scenarios or test cases. The team members and other reviewers; if there are
any, can make constructive comments on suspected problem areas. Interaction and
questions are highly encouraged during the walkthrough. A record of all errors detected
should be documented. This is to ensure the errors are corrected at a later time.
Walkthroughs are relatively inexpensive devices to identify existing design or
programming errors before they become permanent in the product.
The modeler also needs to read the code to ensure that the right data and the logic
have been entered. A useful idea is to get a second, independent check on the code. On
the other hand, as an alternate, the code might be expressed in a non-technical format and
a non-expert could check the data and the logic. This can be especially useful for
obtaining the system expert's opinion.
3.2.4 Visual Checks and Animation
The visual display of the model is a very powerful aid for verification. By
running the model and then watching how each element behaves, the model logic is
compared against the real world behavior. According to Robinson, some of the
techniques that can be used are [26]:
1. Stepping through the model event by event.
2. Stopping the model while it is running and then predicting what will happen
next and after that running the model on and checking what happens.
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3. Setting up interactive conditions on purpose to force certain events to take
place.
4. Closing or isolating some areas of the model so it runs faster, and reducing the
time to perform verification.
5. Explaining the model to those people who are knowledgeable or experts about
the real system in an attempt to get their opinion about how close the model is to
the real system.
6. Tracing the progress of an item through the model.
It is also very useful to watch a model running for a period of time. Just by
watching the model run, a lot can be learned about the behavior of the model. Another
useful technique would be to demonstrate the model, either formally or informally, to
those who have a detailed knowledge of the system. This is helpful in two ways. First,
this helps the VV&A agent to identify any shortcomings in the model. Second, involving
the real system experts to this effort should increase the credibility of the work.
The actual and the expected results from a simulation run are compared using the
output reports. One valuable report is a trace of a simulation as it moves through time.
This is a step-by-step history of every event, which took place during the run and is
written to a file. Inspecting this report can help identify and rectify any problems before
they become permanent flaws in the model. An inspection begins with the distribution of
the item to be inspected. Participants should analyze the item on their own. During the
inspection, each item is jointly analyzed to find as many errors as possible. All errors
found are recorded, but no attempt is necessary to correct the errors at this time.
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However, at some point in future, it must be verified that all errors documented have
been corrected.
The VV&A agent may also use animation to verify the model if the system being
modeled is dynamic. Animation can be an effective way to find invalid model
assumptions and to enhance the credibility of a simulation model. Moving pictures or
cartoons are used as dynamic displays of the simulated system so that the user can
visualize the simulation. Since the users are familiar with the real system, they can detect
programming errors. For example in a traffic simulation, cars might cross through each
other, or in a bank simulation, customers may disappear during the simulation run. Since
all these problems are not the intentions of the programmer, they are the concerns of
verification. There are also risks of using animation. Generally, animations make the
simulations run slower. Due to this handicap, users tend to concentrate on short
simulation runs so the problems that occur only in long runs may go unnoticed. It is the
VV&A analyst's job during verification to continue the runs long enough to create the
rare events. Rare events occur infrequently and only after a certain time unit in the
simulation. If the simulation is not run for enough time units, any problems related with
these rare events may go unnoticed.

3.3 Validation
The basic principle of validation is controlled execution of a program with known
inputs and outputs combined with internal measurement of the behavior of the simulation
model. The notion of controlled execution forms the basis for a systematic methodology
for carrying out the program validation process for a simulation model system. A
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systematic methodology to accomplish the testing gives the user confidence in the quality
of the end product. Each step in the systematic methodology involves repeated
applications of the basic testing principles.
Some test situations will involve a number of separate tests of individual modules
in the model. One of the objectives of testing is to construct scenarios that exercise a
program's structure in a particular way. It is also important to develop series of tests that
affirm the actual content of the simulation model. Using analytical results of the simple
system or actual results from known or prior systems are examples of such tests.
Another important aspect of validation is the sensitivity of input parameters. The
simulation is run under a variety of input settings and checked if the output is reasonable.
The most definitive test of a simulation model's validity is to establish that it's output
data closely resemble what is expected from the actual system. The output data are
compared to those from the existing system itself. If the two sets of data compare
"closely", then the model of the existing system is considered "valid". The greater the
commonality between the existing and proposed systems, the greater our confidence in
the model of the proposed system.
Once the VV&A agent proves that the simulation model is programmed correctly,
he can then move to the next level where they have to answer the question: is the
conceptual simulation model an accurate representation of the system under study or the
real world? The validation process shows the faithfulness of the model or simulation to
the thing being represented. It provides crucial evidence to support a model or
simulation's credibility for a particular application.
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The validity of a model or simulation also reduces risks. This is especially critical
in a project that depends on simulation for its development or management decisions.
The validity of a model or simulation supports, but does not guarantee, project credibility
in all cases. Most of the time, credibility of a model relies upon the trust that the user has
in the validation results, the process that produced that results, and the people that
executed that process. Users must believe in the credibility of a model or simulation
before they will use it. Validation of a model or simulation starts with complete and
consistent statement of the requirements derived from the user's objectives. Description
of the characteristics of the model and description of the expert knowledge against which
the model will be compared for accuracy and exactness should also be included.
Validation process will be evaluated in three parts. The first part will be
validation with available data. Comparison to real life system technique will be
explained in this section. The second part will be validation with no data. Comparison to
other models and comparison to analytical results are the two techniques that will be
explained in this section. In the last part the usability of the model will be evaluated.
3.3.1 Comparison with Real System
3.3.1.1 Data Validation
Historic or expected data collected from the real system can be compared to the
results of the simulation when it is run under the same conditions. To obtain a valid
model, the VV&A agent should try to measure the inputs and outputs of the real system.
In the real world, data are available in different quantities.
Sometimes it is difficult or even impossible to get relevant data. For example, if
the simulation studies of a nuclear war are taken in to consideration, it is impossible to
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get the necessary data. For a simulation study of animal population dynamics, it might be
a major problem to obtain data on the animal behavior. The analyst or the agent might
end up spending more effort on data collection than the study itself. In most cases, some
data is available. In the case of an existing manufacturing system, the agent can obtain
realistic data about the system.
The military commonly conducts field tests in order to obtain data on future
systems. In some applications, there is an overload of data. This generally happens when
the data are obtained electronically. For example, in the simulation of the performance of
computer systems, data on the system-state can be collected each nanosecond. In
addition, the analysts may use the model history to improve validation based on the
additional data. In the end, real world data may be very little or abundant. Moreover,
the data may show observation error, which complicates the comparison of real and
simulated results.
Validation data are actual measurements from the real world or are best guess
information provided by subject matter experts. They are used in validation to determine
if the results of the simulation are correct for the simulation to be useful for the intended
purpose. Validation data are the real world facts used for comparison to validate the
results of a simulation.
3.3.1.2 Comparison Techniques
When the VV&A agent succeeds in obtaining data on real system, it is fed into
the model in historical order. After running the simulation program, the VV&A agent
obtains a time series of simulation output and compares that time series with the
historical time series for the output of the existing system. While conducting validation
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the VV&A agent should not sample from a distribution of real world input values. The
historical input values must be used in historical order. After the agent has validated the
simulation model, he can compare different scenarios using sampled inputs. The VV&A
agent can compare a time series of simulation model output with a historical time series
output by using several different techniques.
The output data of the real system and the simulated system can be plotted in a
diagram such that the horizontal axis denotes time and the vertical axis denotes the real
and simulated values respectively. The user may eyeball the time paths to decide
whether the simulation model accurately reflects the system of interest, or in other words,
determines if the model's output behavior has sufficient accuracy for its intended
purpose. Different types of graphs like histograms, box plots, or scatter plots can be
used. A variety of graphs using different types of measures such as the mean, variance,
maximum, distribution, and time series of variable are required. It is important that
appropriate measures and relationships should be used in validating the model. The
graphs can also be used in the face validity technique where experts make judgments on
whether a model possesses sufficient accuracy for its intended purpose. Finally, the
graphs can be used in Turing tests.
In Turing tests, the agent presents a mixture of simulated and real time series to
their clients, and challenges them to identify the data that were generated by the
computer. The clients may correctly identify some of the data by chance, however, the
agent can test this coincidence statistically. In addition, the VV&A agent can directly use
mathematical statistics to obtain quantitative data about the quality of the simulation
model. The simulation output data form time series whereas elementary statistical
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procedures use identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) observations.
Nevertheless i.i.d. observations can be derived from the simulation so that elementary
statistical theory can be applied.
Kleijnen applies the statistical theory in the following example [19]. Let wt and vt
denote the average waiting time on day i in the simulation and the real system
respectively. Suppose that n days are simulated and observed in reality, i = 1,..., n.
The averages do not need to be computed from a steady state time series of individual
waiting times. They may be calculated from the individual waiting times of all customers
arriving at a specific time interval. Each day includes a start up, and a transient phase. In
this case, both the simulated averages (w,) and the real averages (v,) are i.i.d. If the
historical arrival and service times are used to drive the simulation model, then the n
paired differences (d( = wt - vj, are statistically i.i.d. The t statistics given below can be
used to check the output accuracy:

t(n.D = ( d-S)/(sd/4i)

(3.1)

where d denotes the average of the n number of d's, 8 is the expected value of d, and Sd
represents the estimated standard deviation of d. The variable dt = w, - v, is the
difference between simulated and real average waiting time on day i when using the same
arrival and service times. Hence d is the average of the n differences between the n
average simulated and n average real waiting times per day.
Suppose that the null hypothesis is Ho: 8 = 0, and gives a value tn.i that is
significant for | tn.i\ > tn.i;a/2. The simulation model is rejected, since the model gives
average waiting times per day that deviate significantly from reality. In the case of a
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non-significant \t„.i\, the conclusion is that the simulated and the real means are
statistically the same and the simulation is valid. This interpretation is a good one but the
simulation is only a model, so 8 is never exactly zero. The bigger the sample size is, the
smaller the critical value t„.i -a/2 is; for example, for a fixed a = 0.05 and n = 5 and n =
121 respectively, tn.i ;a/2 = 2.776 and t„.j ;a/2 = 1 -98 respectively. All other things being
equal, a simulation model has a higher chance of being rejected as its sample size gets
bigger. Simulating many days gives a precise estimate d and hence a significant^.;. In
a case like this, model misspecification leads to rejection if the sample size n were
infinite. If the sample is very large, then the t statistic is nearly always significant for 8 *
0. Nevertheless, the simulated and the real means may be compared to determine if the
simulation is valid enough. For example, E (Wj) = 1000 and E (Vj) =1001 (8 = 1), then
the simulation model is good enough for all practical purposes.
In general, when testing the validity of a model through statistics, the VV&A
agent can make either a type I or a type II error. That is, they may reject the model while
the model is valid; type I or a error. On the other hand, they may accept the model while
the model is not valid; type II or ß error. The probability of a ß error is the complement
of the power of the test, which is the probability of rejecting the model when the model is
wrong. The probability of a type I error in simulation is called model builder's risk; the
type II error probability is the model user's risk.
The power of the test of Ho: 8 = 0 increases as the model specification (true 8)
increases. A significance or critical level a means that the type I error probability equals
a. The probability of a ß error increases as a decreases, given a fixed number simulated
days. If a is kept constant and n increases, then t„.i;a/2 decreases. Another problem to
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overcome is the selection of a value for a. Popular values are 0.10 and 0.05 [27].
Theoretically, the VV&A agent should determine these values by accounting for the
financial consequences or overall impact of making type I and type II errors respectively.
Tests based on classic regression analysis can be used. The first test looks at the
relative value of the output variable. If we suppose on a certain day (let it be 4) the real
average waiting time is relatively high, higher than expected (v^ >E(v)), it seems
reasonable to require that on that day the simulated average is also relatively high (W4
>E(w)). The test checks that v and w are positively correlated: Ho: p > 0 (p denotes the
linear correlation coefficient). The VV&A agent can formulate a validation test, which is
simulated, and real responses do not necessarily have the same mean, but they are
positively correlated. To investigate this correlation, the agent may plot the n pairs (v,,
Wj). The graphical approach can be formalized through the use of the ordinary least
squares algorithm. Testing the hypothesis of positively correlated v and w is simple if v
and w are bivariate normally distributed. This is a realistic assumption because of the
central limit theorem. It can be proved that such a bivariate normal distribution implies a
linear relationship between the conditional mean of one variable and the value of the
other variable:

£(w|v = v.) = ßo + ßi*v

(3.2)

The agent can use ordinary least squares to estimate the intercept and the slope of
the straight line that passes through the cloud of points (vt, w,). The test concerns onesided hypothesis Ho: ßi < 0. The t statistic can be used to test this null-hypothesis. This
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test means that the agent rejects the null-hypothesis and accepts the simulation model if
there is strong evidence that the simulated and the real responses are positively
correlated. This test must be modified if the simulation is meant to predict absolute
responses not relative responses corresponding to different scenarios. In this case, the
agent should formulate the test that the means of w (the simulated response) and v (the
historical response) are identical, and if a historical observation exceeds its mean, then
the corresponding simulated observation tends to exceed its mean too. These two
conditions lead to the composite hypothesis Ho: ßo = 0 and ßi = 1, which implies E(w) =
E(v). To test this composite hypothesis, the agent should compute the Sum of Squared
Errors (SSE) with and without that hypothesis (which corresponds to the reduced and the
full regression model respectively), and compare these two values. If the resulting F
statistics is significantly high, the agent should reject the hypothesis and conclude that the
simulation model is not valid.
3.3.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Models and sub-models with unobservable inputs and outputs cannot be subjected
to tests defined in the comparison techniques. In this case, the agent can apply sensitivity
analysis in order to determine whether the model's behavior agrees with the judgments of
the experts. Since the experts can predict what to expect from the system for different
settings of inputs, sensitivity analysis results can be compared to these expectations. If
the systems are simple enough, outputs can be predicted using simple analytic methods.
If the outputs are available for different kinds of settings, sensitivity analysis is a very
useful tool.
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Sensitivity analysis or in other words, what-if analysis can be defined as the
systematic investigation of the reaction of model outputs to intentional changes in model
inputs or model structure. For example, in the case of a queuing simulation model what
happens to the output when the arrival rate doubles or decreases to half? Experts can
predicted before hand what to expect in both cases and then the simulation can be run
with different inputs. The outputs should be similar to what the experts are predicting.
Designs of experiments and regression analysis are the most common techniques that are
used for sensitivity analysis. Most of the time practitioners apply an inferior design of
experiments. They only change one simulation input at a time. If compared to fractional
factorial designs (such as 2k"p designs), the one at a time designs give estimated effect of
input changes that have higher variances. Not only they are less accurate, these designs
cannot estimate interactions among inputs.
The results of these experiments with simulation models can be analyzed and used
for interpolation and extrapolation. The W&A agent can plot the simulation output (let
it be y) versus the simulation input (let it be Xk), one plot for each input k with k=l,... ,K
This practice can be formalized through regression analysis. If we let y, denote the
simulation output in run i of the K simulation inputs, with i = 1,..., n, n denotes the total
number of simulation runs. Furthermore, let Xjk be the value of simulation input k in run i
and ßk the main or first order effect of input k, ßkk- the interaction between inputs k and
k', and ej the approximation (fitting) error in run i. Then the input -output behavior of
the simulation model may be approximated through the regression model as Kleijnen
states [19]:
K
k=\

K-l

K

k=\ k'=k+\
k
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The validity of this approximation must also be tested by using cross validation.
Cross validation uses a subset of simulation inputs and output data to get estimated
A

regression parameters (ß ). Then it employs the estimated regression model to compute
A

the forecast y for some other input combinations. The comparison of the forecasted
A

output y and simulated output y is used to validate the regression model. This approach
A

gives estimates, ß of the effects of the various inputs. These estimated effects should
have the right signs. Wrong signs show computer errors or conceptual errors. If there are
any sensitivity estimates with wrong signs, the simulation model needs to be corrected.
Classical experimental designs with n > K may require excess computer time
especially when the simulation study is still in its early phase. A screening technique
based on sequential experimentation with the simulation model can be used. The
aggregated inputs can be split up until finally the important individual inputs are
identified and their effects are estimated. In some cases, it is remarkable that this
statistical technique identifies some inputs, which were originally thought to be
unimportant. The magnitude of the sensitivity estimates show which inputs are
important. For important inputs the VV&A agent should try to collect data on the input
values that may occur in practice. If the data can be collected for these inputs, then the
comparison techniques discussed in the previous section can be applied.
Before executing the experimental design (either one at a time or fractional
factorial), the agent must determine the experimental domain. The experimental domain
is "the limited set of circumstances under which the real system is to be observed or
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experimented with" [19]. The design will tell us how to explore the experimental
domain, because the model may be valid in one experimental domain but invalid in
another one. For example, older data may not be representative of the current system.
Different types of laws might have ruled the old system. Similarly, a model is accurate
only if the values of its input data remain within a certain range. There are some
objections to this idea because some experts think that a model should maintain valid
under extreme conditions. This is not a very hard problem to overcome because the
definition of extreme is relative to each expert. The only problem is to figure out how
they defined extreme.
For this research we will comply with the idea that the simulation model is valid
within a certain area of its inputs only. This area can be defined as the K dimensional
hypercube formed by the K input ranges and within that area the simulation model's
input-output behavior might vary [28].
As a conclusion the sensitivity analysis should be applied to identify important
inputs and test for realistic output behavior. This information is useful even if there are
many data on the input and output of the simulated system. Collecting information on the
important inputs is worth the effort and might be useful for future research.

3.3.2 Validation with Limited Experimental Data or No Data
Sometimes the cost and the time required to conduct experimentation may limit
the amount of experimental data available for validation. In this situation, using
experimental or empirical data collected from other activities for similar situations can be
helpful. Another option is extending the range of experimental data with calculations
from consistent and validated models or inputs from subject matter experts.
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The process of constructing referents needs as many credible sources as possible.
Lack of experimental data requires reliance on other sources. Multiple data sets from
different sources can be merged into a single referent. The consistency of each set against
each other must be checked very carefully to improve the credibility of the referent and
the validation. Sometimes, even a single experimental point can support validation. But,
this cannot be done without credible data from other sources. Just by itself, a single
experimental data point cannot validate a model or simulation for any purpose. In
general the VV&A agent should use extreme caution when extrapolating from a limited
number of field tests to assess overall model validity.

3.3.2.1 Comparison with Other Models
Comparison with other models is particularly useful when no real system data are
available. However, real data should be used when available. Indeed, using other model
comparisons in addition to the real world data comparison can increase the confidence on
the model.
One approach is to compare the simulation model against a mathematical model.
It is generally not common for a mathematical model to be able to predict the outcome of
the simulation exactly. Otherwise the simulation model would not have been built.
However, a mathematical model may be able to give a crude approximation of the
outputs of the real system. Examples of mathematical models that might be used are
paper calculations, spreadsheet analysis and queuing theory. It is sometimes useful to
simplify the simulation model to the extent that a mathematical model can predict exactly
the outcome of the model. A specific example of this can be the use of deterministic
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models. This is a simulation model from which all the random events have been
removed. In many cases it is possible to determine mathematically the exact outcome of
such a model.
Comparisons can also be made against other simulation models of the same or
similar systems. For instance, a more detailed model of the system may have been
developed for some other purpose. Or a general simulation model for similar systems is
already available. If another simulation model is used during comparison it is supposed
that the other simulation model is valid and credible.

3.3.2.2 Comparison to Analytical Results
Analytical comparison techniques examine the structure of models and
simulations. There should be enough notional data or symbolic values that permit the
agent to compare the model or simulation with the calculated analytical results. This
comparison technique must be used starting from the development phase of the model,
especially during the conceptual model validation.
Generally, notional values are preferred rather than actual data because they are
easier to obtain or assign. These symbolic values are fed into the model and outputs are
produced. They are also transformed analytically and results from these analytical
transformations are compared to the result obtained from the simulation model. The
results may not exactly coincide but they should be in agreement at a specified level of
confidence.
Analytical comparison has some disadvantages. As the model or the system that
is simulated grows in size or becomes more complex, the calculations required for
comparisons also grow in size. Some parts of the system that are simulated may not be
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represented with symbolic values. In this case these parts may be evaluated
independently. Even though complexity of the system creates difficulties for the agent,
using symbolic values tests the basic characteristics of the simulation model.

3.3.3 Usability of the Model
Even though usability of the model does not seem to be an important subject on
the developer side, it is very important for the user. The W&A agent should make sure
that the model is as user friendly as possible. In most cases, being user friendly increases
the popularity and the credibility of the modeling and simulation product.
First of all, the VV&A agent should spend enough time to validate the interface.
Each and every capability of the interface should be used. Every feature of the model
should be tested in order to comply with the requirements. For the end product to be free
of errors, all features must respond in the way that they are programmed. A surprised
user will not increase the credibility of the model. In addition, these kinds of problems
will require additional verification and validation efforts before the accreditation phase.
Additional verification and validation will yield to additional time requirements, and time
is a very valuable constraint.

3.4 Accreditation
According to DoD 5000.59, accreditation is required for all important applications
where models and simulations are employed [14]. The primary purpose of accreditation
is to establish modeling and simulation credibility. The accreditation agent accumulates
data that supports modeling and simulation suitability for a given application. Although
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the entire VV&A process contributes to model credibility, the accreditation assessment
and the resulting accreditation decision are the key steps in establishing model suitability
for a specific application. Accreditation is always associated with a specific purpose or
application. It is a comparison of a model's capabilities and attributes with the modeling
requirements generated by the specific problem. To make a judgment about model
suitability, the agent must have clear description of what the model can or cannot do.
Two critical steps for accreditation are to clearly define the problem and modeling
requirements associated with it and to obtain a clear understanding of the model's proven
capabilities and limitations. Comparison of the modeling and simulation requirements
with basic model information leads to an accreditation decision. Three outcomes are
possible; use an existing model as is, modify an existing model, or build a new model.
This is referred to as choosing a modeling approach.
Once the modeling approach has been chosen, one builds a body of evidence that
shows the selected model or simulation is acceptable for use in the intended application.
This evidence generally consists of basic information about the model or simulation,
validation and verification results, and information about the data. This information
generally answers five questions:
1. What does the model do?
2. How good is the software?
3. Are the model outputs realistic?
4. Can the model be operated properly and the results interpreted correctly?
5. Is the data satisfactory?
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The answers to these questions are the basis for judging model acceptability.
While building the body of evidence, the agent uses all the available information
generated during model development or by the past model users. If there are any gaps in
this information, the information package is incomplete for the accreditation purpose. In
this case, additional verification, validation or other data collection efforts are necessary.
Prior to accrediting the model or simulation, the agent conducts the necessary verification
and validation to fill in the gaps. The supplemental verification and validation
information, along with existing information, is used to conduct the accreditation
assessment. At this step, the requirements of the problem are compared against the
capabilities and characteristics of the model and the suitability is determined. This is the
last step, which results in the accreditation recommendation.

3.4.1 Assessment
Once the accreditation requirements (modeling and credibility) are known, and
the VV&A information have been gathered, the agent can conduct the accreditation
assessment. The accreditation assessment is essentially a comparison of a model's
capabilities and attributes with the modeling and simulation requirements. The
comparison is usually an iterative process. The first iteration usually leads to a list of
information deficiencies about the model and these information deficiencies can lead to
supplemental verification and validation work. Once the supplemental verification and
validation information has been gathered, a final comparison is made to generate the
basis that supports accreditation. In some cases this assessment can uncover model
deficiencies with respect to the requirements of the problem.
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If model deficiencies are identified during this assessment, the VV&A agent or
team determines whether the deficiency is tolerable. However, in some cases the
deficiency is intolerable, especially when there is a better modeling technique that avoids
the deficiency. Manual adjustments of input or output values, or changes to parameters
within the model may often compensate for model deficiencies. Adjustments can
preserve the ability to use a particular model with minor deficiencies. Another option is
to limit the model's use to certain scenarios where the outputs are known to be
acceptable. The last step in assessment is good reporting. The agent or the team of
agents assemble the findings and make an overall assessment about model suitability and
risks of using the model reviewed. Any recommendations or additional verification and
validation work should also be included.

3.4.2 Accreditation Report
One of the responsibilities of the accreditation agent is to prepare a good report of
the accreditation assessment. The accreditation report serves as a checklist to ensure the
accreditation assessment or process has generated the necessary information. The
essential elements to include in the accreditation report are [18]:
1. List of simulation acceptability criteria.
2. A description of simulation capabilities and limitations.
3. Summary report of the accreditation assessment showing how the simulation
meets the acceptability criteria or if does not meet it, what kind of risks might be
associated with the limitations of the simulation.
4. Accreditation statement.
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All these elements can be contained in a single report or in multiple documents.
The VV&A agent should ensure the user recognizes the importance of archiving this
information. The agent should help the user to develop appropriate techniques to capture
this information and ensure they have adequate resources for preserving it. The
accreditation assessment report helps the VV&A agent or the team to focus on the
suitability of the application instead of its capabilities. This helps the team to expedite
clarifying the major issues and saves time.
The acceptability criteria (first element of the accreditation report) are
documented as a separate report or included in the accreditation report. A description of
requirements derived from the basic problem objectives and parameters are included.
This action allows others to review and validate these requirements if necessary. The
description of simulation capabilities, assumptions, and limitations related to the intended
application is normally included as a part of the accreditation. All simulation
assumptions and limitations identified during the development and associated verification
and validation efforts are documented. The conceptual model, which is developed as a
part of the new model development process, contains most of the simulation capabilities.
The accreditation assessment report is an essential document needed by the user
to make the accreditation decision. For the accreditation of a new simulation model, the
document presents evidence that the simulation model meets the acceptability criteria. If
there are any criteria that are not met, the accreditation assessment report includes an
evaluation of the impact of not meeting these criteria. In addition, the report lists the
potential ways to fix these problems and the associated risks with them. This evaluation
prioritizes the tasks again and distributes the resources objectively to meet the simulation
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acceptability criteria. The accreditation assessment report includes comments about the
evaluation and recommendations about the credibility and the accuracy of the data being
used. If it is appropriate, this report includes the suitability evaluation of the operators
necessary to properly run the simulation and interpret its results.
The typical accreditation statement is a brief (most of the time just one page)
executive summary that includes a synopsis of the basis for the accreditation
recommendation. This brief statement includes a list of limitations and recommended
constraints on the accreditation, and an approval statement for the accreditation authority
to sign. By itself, the accreditation statement only shows that an accreditation assessment
has been completed. However, when this statement is contained in a package
accompanied by other supporting documents, the entire package presents the logical basis
for accreditation.
However, for the accreditation of a model, not all the steps in the generic VV&A
plan have to be accomplished. Some of the steps can be omitted if applicable. In some
cases additional steps might be added according to the accreditation acceptability criteria.
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4. Application
As stated in thesis outline (Section 1.5), this chapter is going to be the application
of the generic VV&A plan outlined in Chapter 3 to RAPTOR. At first, our intention was
to apply only the validation portion of this generic plan. Validation only, however, is not
adequate to understand model performance. Validation shows if a simulation model is an
accurate representation of the real world or in other words if we have built the right
model. As a matter of fact, we cannot be completely sure if we have built the right model
unless we are sure that the model is working correctly. In order to be sure that the model
is working correctly, a partial verification of the model should be accomplished before
continuing with the validation effort. The verification of the model is outside the scope
of this effort but an accreditation report with recommendations will be given in Chapter
5.
The verification should start with the verification of the distributions and random
number generators used in the simulation model. These features have already been
verified in the verification efforts of Raptor 2.0 (30 January 1996). The new version uses
the same distributions and the random number generators. The inspection of trace reports
technique is used to fulfill the partial verification requirement. This report is a trace of all
simulation activities. The report is a step-by-step history of every event (event log) that
takes place during the simulation run. This report is then written to a file and will be
used to make the necessary calculations during verification.
While accomplishing the verification of RAPTOR 5.0, three different systems
will be used as a foundation: a simple system, a complex system, and a system using the
phasing feature of RAPTOR 5.0 (phasing is a new feature added to 5.0). The objective of
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tracing these three systems is to use as many features as possible. Using one system,
which captures all features would be difficult to analyze. More importantly, breaking the
trace verification into three systems allows additional analysis to be accomplished. In a
single system, it would be very hard to distinguish any possible errors and identify the
source at the coding error. All three systems use different features and in the case of any
errors, it is easier to identify and isolate the coding error. Another reason using three
different systems is the time constraint. A complicated system takes more time to be
simulated and also to be investigated. Breaking the system in to manageable sizes is
more efficient.
Section 3.1 outlined the VV&A plan to be used for RAPTOR. The first six steps
of this plan are explained in the next paragraph. Step 7(planned verification activities)
and step 8(planned validation activities) will be accomplished in the following sections
and the reports (step 10) will be given after these activities are performed. Step
11 (description and location of VV&A archives to support accreditation and future use) is
this total effort itself.
The purpose of this VV&A application is to validate RAPTOR simulation model
for use by AFOTEC. This application is not a complete verification and validation effort.
The VV&A agent's responsibility is to develop a generic plan and perform the intended
V&V activities, and make recommendations for accreditation. This model will be used
by AFOTEC for operational test and evaluation of Air Force systems. The model is
developed by AFOTEC (both military and civilian contractors).
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4.1 Verification
The test platform that is used during the verification is a pentium III, 450 Mhz
computer with 128 MB RAM. All simulation runs are accomplished on this platform.
Verifying the requirements is the first step in verification. Older versions of
RAPTOR did not have features like phasing, event blocks or cost analysis. Evaluation of
these new features has priority over other features. In the verification part, all these
features are tested to see if they are operating correctly.
The design of the model has already been determined. This VV&A effort is being
conducted after the simulation has developed. A few recommendations are made.
Another important issue is checking the code. Code checking requires extended amount
of time and an expertise in ModSim simulation language used to create RAPTOR. This
is beyond the scope of this research.
Therefore only implementation (results) verification from the generic plan is
accomplished. Three different systems are used in this part of verification. The first
system used is a simple system. This system uses the basic features of RAPTOR. The
second system is complex system that uses most features of RAPTOR. The third system
uses the phasing feature of RAPTOR. Phasing is a new feature added to the new version
of RAPTOR.
4.1.1 Simple System
The first part of results verification will be done using the simple system shown in
Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Simple System Built in RAPTOR.
This example is a simple system consisting of four nodes and four blocks. With
this system, the basic features of RAPTOR will be tested for accuracy and correctness.
The system will be run for 1000 time units and 10 replications.
The first node is the start node. n2 is the second node in the system and nl is the
third node. The last node in the system is the end node.
The distributions and other special features of blocks are given in Table 1 below:

Table 1. Distributions of Figure 8.
Block

Failure
Rate

Repair
Rate

Spare
Policy

a

Expo
90

Expo
10

Custom

Initial
Level
For
Spares
2

b

Expo
90

Expo
10

Custom

c

Expo
80

Expo
20

d

Expo 70

Expo
30

Series
Spares
Pool
Series
Spares
Pool

Spare
Arrival
Policy

Avg.
Logis.
Delay

System
Dep.

Oper./
Repair
Cost

No

Initial
Block/
Spare
Cost
1/1

30
Units

2

IPer
100
Units
Emerg.
1 per
24
Units

None

Yes

1/1

1/1

100

-

None

No

1/1

1/1

100

-

None

No

1/1

1/1
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The event log of this simulation is given in Appendix A. This event log was used
to track all the failures, capture down-times, and analyze output parameters. Each item on
the results table is calculated manually and then compared to end of simulation results.
The individual failure and repair data is tracked through the entire event log. The
mathematical calculations are done using Microsoft Excel.
End Of Run Report for Simple System.rbd Simulation
End of Run #1

Ending Simulation Time
Number of system failures
Number of component failures

= 1000.000000
= 14
= 37

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

Time Between
Downing Events

29.493177

0.759034

97.380220

29.886280

Down Times

41.935394

1.667713

126.136214

40.818164

Total Time Between
Component Failures

26.833212

0.807927

106.356761

23.274074

Component Repair Times

23.912194

0.135673

93.067539

24.064833

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.412904
= 11.159581
= 26.878026 %
= 14.412423 %
= 58.709552 %

The meaning of each item and how they are calculated are explained in detail
below according to RAPTOR User's Manual [8].
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Mean Time Between Downing Events: This is the average time between events,
which bring the entire system down. MTBDE is calculated as the total time the system
operates (in a green or yellow condition) divided by the number of downing events. The
total time the system operated without any problems (green time) and degraded (yellow)
was calculated manually and they are 268.780257 and 144.124230 respectively. And
there were 14 failures in the system. In our case MTBDE is equal to:

(268.780257+144.124228) /14 = 29.493177

Mean Down Time: This is the average amount of time the entire system is down.
It is calculated as the total amount of system down time divided by the number of
downing events. The total time the system is down is equal to red time. In our case
MDT is equal to:
587.095515/14 = 41.935394

Availability: This is the ratio of the time the system is up to all time. It reflects
what percentage of time the system is available for use. It is calculated as MTBDE
divided by the sum of MTBDE and MDT. RAPTOR calculates availability as the sum of
green and yellow times divided by the sum of green, yellow, and red times. In our case it
is equal to:

(268.780257 + 144.124228) /1000 = 0.412904

Mean Time Between Maintenance: This is the average amount of time between
any maintenance actions performed on any components of the system. It is calculated as
the total time the system operates that is divided by the total number of failures of all
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components. The total time between maintenance events were tracked manually and
summed 412.904485. MTBM is calculated by dividing this amount by the total number
of failures (37).
In our case it is:
412.904485 / 37 = 11.159581
Green Time: Green time is the percent time during a simulation when no
components in the RBD are failed. In our system this time is 26.878026 %.
Yellow Time: Yellow time is the percent time during a simulation when some
components in the RBD are failed, but the overall system is not down. In our case this is
14.412423 %.
Red Time: Red time is the percent time during a simulation when some
components on the critical path in the RBD are failed, causing the overall system to be
down. In our case this time comes up to 58.709552 %.
The cost report (given below) gives the operation, repair, and spares costs of each
block and the overall system relative to the costs defined in the simulation. The initial
cost, operation cost, repair cost, and spare cost per each unit can be defined and entered
as an assigned value to the simulation. The overall cost of operating the system is
calculated automatically at the end of the simulation run. The cost of each and every unit
in the system can also be calculated. This gives the user the flexibility of changing any
high cost item in the system with a lower costing item.
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Cost Data
Block

InitCost

OpCost

RepCost

a
b
c
d

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

642.59
370.46
614.99
679.75

80.23
41.77
385.01
320.25

12.00
4.00
0.00
0.00

735.83
417.23
1001.00
1001.00

Block Totals

4.00

2307.80

827.27

16.00

3155.06

Pool

InitCost

RecurringCost

IndvSpCost

Total

Total

Series

100.00

0.00

100.00

Pool Totals

100.00

0.00

100.00
Grand Total

3255.06

In the simple system all the costs related with each block and the overall system
have been calculated according to the event log and matched the cost report.

4.1.2 Complex System
The second system used in the verification is a more complex system. Different
features like spare pool, cold standby pool, resource pool, average logistics delay are used
in this system. The system in Figure 9 is configured of 13 blocks and 11 nodes including
the start and end node. The system runs for 1000 time units and 10 replications. The
distributions and features of each block and are given in Table 2. All the nodes act the
same as in the simple system. The event log of this simulation is given in Appendix B.
From this event log every item on the end of run results report can be calculated.
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Figure 9. Complex System Built in RAPTOR.
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Table 2. Distributions for Complex System.
Block

Failure
Rate

Repair
Rate

Spare
Policy

Initial
Level
For
Spares

Spare
Arrival
Policy

Average
Logistics
Delay

System
Dependent

Auto
Switch
Prob.

Initial
Level
For
Pool

Oper/
Repair
Cost

Initial/
Spare
Cost

1

Expo
90
Expo
80

Expo
10
Expo
20

Infinite

-

-

None

No

-

-

1/1

1/1

10

1 per
500
Units

None

No

-

10

1/1

1/1

3

Expo
65

Expo
35

—

None

No

linlO

5

1/1

1/1

4

Expo
50

Expo
50

Infinite

-

None

No

-

10

1/1

1/1

5

Expo
70

Expo
30

5

Emerg.
1000
Units

None

Yes

-

5

1/1

1/1

6

Expo
75

Expo
25

—

—

None

No

Iin5

5

1/1

1/1

7

Expo
85

Expo
15

10

No

-

10

1/1

1/1

Expo
30

Expo
70

1 per
500
Units
Emerg.
1000
Units

10

8

None

Yes

-

5

1/1

1/1

9

Expo
35
Expo
60

Expo
65
Expo
40

Spl
Spares
Pool
Cspl
Cold
Stby
Pool
Rpl
Resource
Pool
Sp2
Spares
Pool
Cspl
Cold
Stby
Pool
Spl
Spares
Pool
Sp2
Spares
Pool
Infinite

11

Expo
70

Expo
30

12

Expo
80

Expo
20

13

Expo
90

Expo
10

2

10

Spl
Spares
Pool
Sp2
Spares
Pool
Spl
Spares
Pool
Infinite

5

-

-

None

No

-

-

1/1

1/1

10

1 per
500
Units
Emerg.
1000
Units

None

No

-

10

1/1

1/1

None

No

-

5

1/1

1/1

10

-

None

No

-

10

1/1

1/1

-

-

None

No

-

-

1/1

1/1

5
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End Of Run Report for Complex System.rbd Simulation

End of Run #1
Ending Simulation Time
= 1000.000000
Number of system failures
=7
Number of component failures = 88
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

Time Between
Downing Events

59.723037

5.225078

221.991348

70.239232

Down Times

83.134106

2.039983

499.458498

170.225402

Total Time Between
Component Failures

11.021286

0.039612

48.036386

10.294478

Component Repair Times

39.202524

0.112041

217.157591

50.030583

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.418061
= 4.750696
= 0.094971%
=41.711155%
= 58.193874%

The definitions of all features have already been made in the simple system. For
the complex system only calculations will be shown for each feature.
Mean time Between Downing Events:
418.061261/7 = 59.723037
Mean Down Times:
581.938739/7 = 83.134106
Availability:
(0.949713 + 417.111548) /1000 = 0.418061
Mean Time Between Maintenance:
418.061259/88 = 4.750696
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Green Time:

0.949713

Yellow Time: 417.111548
Red Time:

581.938739

The cost report (given below) gives the operation, repair, and spares costs of each
block and the overall system relative to the costs defined in the simulation.
Cost Data
Block
block4
block3
block2
blockl
block5
blockö
block7
block8
blockl0
block9
blockl 1
blockl2
blockl3
Block Totals

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

OpCost
312.77
880.00
351.70
822.16
227.81
945.00
265.11
22.42
315.55
259.94
130.64
418.74
950.55

RepCost
687.23
621.24
13.80
177.84
53.01
300.82
64.16
217.16
174.81
740.06
83.27
86.35
49.45

13.00

5902.38

3269.21

IndvSpCost
10.00
0.00
0.00
17.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.00
0.00
0.00
8.00

Total
1011.00
1502.24
366.49
1018.00
281.82
1246.82
330.27
240.57
491.36
1008.00
214.92
506.09
1009.00

42.00

9226.59

Pool
spl
sp2
Cspl
Rpl

InitCost
10.00
5.00
5.00
N/A

RecurringCost
2.00
3.00
N/A
687.23

Total
12.00
8.00
5.00
687.23

Pool Totals

20.00

692.23

712.23

Grand Total 9938.82
In the complex system all the costs related with each block and the overall system
were calculated according to the event log and all the results related with the cost report
are correct.
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4.1.3 System with Phasing
The third system used in the verification is a system with phasing. Phasing is a
new feature added to version 5.0. Systems go through different stress levels during their
lives. For example, the stress level for an air-conditioning unit is less in winter. Phasing
feature helps us to model different failure rates or degradation factors in a system for the
same simulation run.
The first step of evaluating the phasing feature is to show that the system changes
its properties in each phase. To evaluate this feature, the system was run for 5000 time
units with different phases starting at each 1000 time units. Statistics were collected for
each phase. These statistics proved that the failure rate changed in proportion to the
assigned degradation factor for each phase.

Block 6

Block 5

Figure 10. System with Phasing Built in RAPTOR
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The system in Figure 10 is configured of 7 blocks and 8 nodes including the start and
end node. The system will be run for 1000 time units and 10 replications. The
distributions and features of each block are given in Table 3 below. All the nodes act the
same as in the simple system. The event log of this simulation is given in Appendix C.
From this event log every item on the end of run results report can be calculated.

Table 3. Distributions for System with Phasing.
Block

Failure
Rate

Repair
Rate

Spare
Policy

Initial
Level
For
Spares

Spare
Arrival
Policy

Degradation
Factor

System
Dependent

Oper/
Repair
Cost

Initial/
Spare
Cost

1

Expo
50
Expo
80

Expo
50
Expo
60

Infinite

-

-

5

No

1/1

1/1

Spares
Pool

10

1 per
200
Units

10

No

1/1

1/1

Expo
50
Expo
35

Expo
25
Expo
50

Infinite

-

-

15

No

1/1

1/1

Spares
Pool

10

1 per
200
Units

1

No

1/1

1/1

Expo
30
Expo
50
Expo
15

Expo
70
Expo
15
Expo
15

Infinite

-

-

3

No

1/1

1/1

Infinite

-

-

5

No

1/1

1/1

Spares
Pool

10

1 per
200
Units

10

No

1/1

1/1

2

3
4

5
6
7

End Of Run Report for Phasing.rbd Simulation
End of Run #1
Ending Simulation Time
= 1000.000000
Number of system failures
=4
Number of component failures = 24
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Mean

Minimum

Maximum

St.Dev

238.844341

18.639987

49.982651

12.241958

Down Times

11.155659

2.365845

18.822031

6.146190

Total Time Between
Component Failures

40.034307

0.407020

201.681831

48.885836

Component Repair Times

39.504491

5.936601

155.112565

38.720333

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.955377
= 39.807390
= 25.570548 %
= 69.967188 %
= 4.462264%

The definitions of all features have already been made in the simple system. For
the system with phasing only calculations will be shown for each feature.

Mean time Between Downing Events:
955.377362 / 4 = 238.844341
Mean Down Times:
44.622638 / 4 = 11.155659
Availability:
(255.705482 + 699.67188) /1000 = 0.955377
Mean Time Between Maintenance:
955.377362/24 = 39.807390
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Green Time: 255.705482
Yellow Time: 699.671880
Red Time:

44.622638

The cost report (given below) gives the operation, repair, and spares costs of each
block and the overall system relative to the costs defined in the simulation.

Cost Data
Block
blockl
block2
block3
block4
block5
blockö
block7
Block Totals

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

OpCost
945.44
982.77
963.20
339.87
824.53
918.64
972.15

RepCost
54.56
17.23
36.80
515.33
175.47
81.36
27.85

7.00

5946.60

908.60

Pool
Spares Pool
Pool Totals

InitCost
10.00
10.00

RecurringCost
5.00
5.00

IndvSpCost
2.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
3.00
3.00
0.00
9.00

Total
1003.00
1001.00
1002.00
856.21
1004.00
1004.00
1001.00
6871.21

Total
15.00
15.00

Grand Total

6886.21

In the system with phasing all the costs related with each block and the overall
system has been calculated according to the event log and all the results related with the
cost report are correct.

78

4.2 Validation of the Model
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that it is generally hard to find reliable
data about systems. Since data about a real life system was not available, comparison to
other models and comparison to analytical results are the two techniques used in
validation process. General usability of the model is also evaluated under validation.
This is necessary to show that the model is performing its intended purposes.

4.2.1 Comparison with Other Models
There are other valid reliability models that are used by different companies and
agencies. These models are similar to one another but are different based on features,
flexibility and capabilities. Three reliability models researched are AvSim, Relex, and
Item. AvSim was selected and is used in our comparison. The same systems are created
in both software packages and the results are compared for validation of our model. The
first system that will be used is shown in Figure 11.

Block 4

Figure 11. Sample System 1 for Comparison
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Table 4. Sample System Features.
Block

Failure
Rate
Mean

1

Expo
100
Expo
90
Expo
70
Expo
65
Expo
85

2
3
4
5

Repair
Rate
Mean/
StDev.
Lognor
10/2
Lognor
20/1
Lognor
25/1
Lognor
15/3
Lognor
5/1

Spare
Policy

Oper/
Repair
Cost

Initial/
Spare
Cost

Infinite

1/1

1/1

Infinite

1/1

1/1

Infinite

1/1

1/1

Infinite

1/1

1/1

Infinite

1/1

1/1

Results for Avsim Simulation:
Total Down Time Over Lifetime (TDT)
: 138.2
Mean Unavailability Over Lifetime (Qm)
: 0.1401
Point Unavailability at Lifetime (Q)
: 0.2
Expected Number of Outages Over Lifetime (W) : 19.1
Probability of 1 or More Outages Over Lifetime (F): 1
Mean Time to First Outage (MTTO)
: 47.3 8
Mean Time Between Outages (MTBO)
: 49.61
Mean Time to Restore to Service (MTTR)
: 7.16

Results for RAPTOR Simulation:
Availability (Ao)
Mean Time Between Downing Events (MTBDE)
Mean Down Time (MDT)
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM)
Mean Repair Time (MRT)
Green Time
Yellow Time
Red Time
System Failures
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0.8529
47.5621
7.7072
16.7727
14.9241
42.7700
42.5235
14.7064
19.1

Although the output names may be different, the information indicated is very
similar for both models. A test of hypothesis can be made to find out if there is any
difference between the results of the two models for the simulation of the same system.
Both simulations are run for 10 times so our sample size is 10. The first result that will
be evaluated is availability. The sample standard deviation for AvSim simulation is
Si = 0.01047 and the sample standard deviation for RAPTOR S2 = 0.03523. The mean
availability for AvSim simulation is ui = 0.8599 and the mean availability for RAPTOR
simulation is u^ - 0.8529.
The null hypothesis is:

Ho: Ui - u^ = 0

Alternative hypothesis is:

Hi: ui - U2 * 0

The tests statistics that can be used to test this hypothesis is:

t0= (( x,- x2) - 0) / SPV((1 / n.) + (1 / n2))

(4.1)

Where
(Sp)2 = ((n, - 1)(S,)2 + (n2 -1)(S2)2 / (n, + n2-2)

(4.2)

(Sp)2 = ((10 -1)(0.03523)2 + (10 - 1)(0.01047)2) / (10 + 10-2)
(Sp)2 = 0.000675
Sp = 0.02598
Then the test statistics is:

t0 = (0.8599 - 0.8529) / 0.02598(V((1 /10) + (1 /10))
t„ = 0.60248
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The rejection region for the hypothesis is:
to-5" to/2,nl+n2-2

(4.3)

For a = 0.05 to.025, is = 2.101, so t0= 0.602 is not greater than 2.101 and it is not in
the rejection region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to
conclude that the two results differ from each other.
The second result that will be evaluated is mean time between downing events or
mean time between outages. The sample standard deviation for MTBO is Si = 8.1973.
The sample standard deviation for MTBDE is S2 = 13.3344. The mean MTBO is
H! = 49.61. The mean MTBDE is [i2 = 47.5621.

The null hypothesis is:

Ho: Hi - u-2 = 0

Alternative hypothesis is:

Hi: u-i - U2 * 0

(Sp)2 = ((n, - 1)(S02 + (n2 -1)(S2)2 / (n, + n2-2)
(Sp)2 = ((10 -1)(8.1973)2 + (10 - 1)(13.3344)2) / (10 +10-2)
(Sp)2 = 122.5
Sp= 11.068
Then the test statistics is:
t0 = (49.61-47.5621) / 11.068(V((1 /10) + (1 /10))
t0 = 0.414
The rejection region for the hypothesis is:
to

>

to/2,nl+n2-2
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For a = 0.05 W-, u = 2.101, so t0= 0.414 is not greater than 2.101 and it is not in
the rejection region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to
conclude that the two results differ from each other.
The third result that will be evaluated is mean time to restore to service or mean
downtime. The sample standard deviation for MTTR is Si = 0.7903. The sample
standard deviation for MDT is S2 = 0.8949. The mean MTTR is (j,! = 7.16 and the mean
MDT is U2 = 7.7072.

The null hypothesis is:

Ho: ui - us = 0

Alternative hypothesis is:

Hi: ui - ua * 0

(Sp)2 = ((n, - 1)(S02 + (n2 -1)(S2)2 / (n, + n2-2)
(Sp)2 = ((10 -1)(0.7903)2 + (10 - 1)(0.8949)2) / (10 +10-2)
(Sp)2 = 0.7127
Sp = 0.8442
Then the test statistics is:
t0 = (7.7072- 7.16) / 0.8442(V((1 /10) + (1 /10))
t0 =1.45
The rejection region for the hypothesis is:
t0 > W2, nl + n2 - 2

For a = 0.05 to.025, is= 2.101, so to= 1.45 is not greater than 2.101 and it is not in
the rejection region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to
conclude that the two results differ from each other.
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Two more systems are simulated to compare the results. The detailed results log
for these simulations for both RAPTOR and AvSim are attached in Appendix D. A less
detailed table will be used to compare these two system simulations. All assumptions
made for the first system applies to the second and the third system.

The null hypothesis is:

H0: u-i - U2 = 0

Alternative hypothesis is:

Hi: \ii - us * 0

Table 5. Test Statistics for System 2.
Mi

V*

Si

s2

Sp

to

to.025, 18

Availability

0.8216

0.8489

0.0448

0.0391

0.042

1.4534

2.101

MTBO
MTBDE

100.207

85.3458

30.6357

17.7718

25.0437

1.3269

2.101

MTTR
MDT

14.683

14.4298

0.5107

1.554

1.1566

0.4895

2.101

Number of
System
Failures

12.2

10.4

3.2249

2.2449

2.7784

1.4486

2.101

Table 6. Test Statistics for System 3.
Mi

H2

Si

to

to.025, 18

0.9612

0.95

0.021

S2
0.0144

Sp

Availability

0.018

1.3913

2.101

MTBO
MTBDE

150.881

114.337

51.6158

22.1187

39.7078

2.0579

2.101

MTTR
MDT

5.3068

5.7819

2.0127

1.407

1.7364

0.6118

2.101

Number of
System
Failures

7.1

8.6

2.4698

1.562

2.0663

1.6232

2.101
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For both systems test statistics to< to.025,18 =2.101 and it is not in the rejection
region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to conclude that the
two results differ from each other.
As mentioned earlier these software packages have a lot in common, but they are
not applicable for every system. The types of results obtained from the other two
software packages do not match with RAPTOR output. The software packages are
tracking different parameters. They are also very complicated to use which makes them
hard to learn. This is one of the superiorities of RAPTOR. It is easy to learn and userfriendly.
RAPTOR results also contain the minimum value, maximum value, and the
standard deviation for each item on the results box. The results for the third system are
evaluated manually. There are no errors found on these calculations. The standard
deviations are calculated manually and they are correct. The minimum and the maximum
values in Appendix D are highlighted for easier evaluation.

4.2.2 Comparison to Analytical Results
Sample reliability system in Figure 12 is used to compare RAPTOR results with
calculated analytical results. These are relatively simpler systems compared to the ones
used in comparison to other simulation models. The system in Figure 12 will be
evaluated in details. Other evaluations are based on the assumptions used in the first
system.
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Figure 12. Sample RBD for Analytical Comparison.
Each block is assigned a certain reliability value. The event feature of RAPTOR
is used in these comparisons. The event block is assigned certain probability values,
while block diagrams are assigned distributions. The result obtained from event
diagrams is 0.5386. The system's reliability obtained from analytical evaluations is R\ =
pi = 0.5355. Reliability obtained from block diagrams (using exponential distribution)
for 10 runs is R2 = p2 = 0.5360. The standard deviation is

S = 0.06454.

The null hypothesis is:

Ho: pi = p2

Alternative hypothesis is:

Hi: pi * p2
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The test statistics that can be used is:
t = (P2-pi)/(S/Vn)

(4.4)

The rejection region is:
It l> to/2 ;(„-i)

where to.o25;9 = 2.262

t = (0.5360 - 0.5355) / (0.06454 / VlO)
t = 0.0245
Since 111 < to.025; 9= 2.262, and it is not in the rejection region, we can conclude
that at a = 0.05 level of significance we do not have enough evidence to reject Ho and
conclude there is no difference between the two results.
Two more simulation systems are also used in the evaluation. These systems are
not described in detail. They are also built using the exponential distribution for failure
and repair rates. The results for these two simulations along with other features are given
in the following table. Comparisons are made using the same test statistics and rejection
region. Assumptions used in the first comparison apply to these comparisons, too.

Table 7. Test Statistics for Analytical Comparison.
Analytical
Results

RAPTOR
Results

Standard

t

to.025 ; 9

Deviation
Simulation
1
Simulation
2
Simulation
3

0.5355

0.5360

0.06454

0.0245

2.262

0.8968

0.9051

0.03529

0.7437

2.262

0.9992

0.9991

0.00197

0.1605

2.262
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For both systems test statistics to< to.025,9 =2.262 and it is not in the rejection
region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to conclude that the
two results for both simulations differ from each other.

4.2.3 Usability of the Model
In general terms, RAPTOR is fairly easy to learn and very user-friendly. Most of
the features are working correctly and without any deficiencies. However, the following
comments are provided addressing RAPTOR'S usability and possible improvements.
There are a few minor problems that should be fixed to improve this modeling tool.
1.

The first problem is the position of the information box that appears during
the simulation runs. This box appears at the lower left portion of the
interface and hinders the lower bar that gives the number of replications
during the simulation run. This box can be moved to the top and it changes
to a bar when moved, but it does not stay there in the next run. Each time
the simulation begins, the box appears at the bottom left. This box should
be moved to the top where it does not restrict the view and should stay there
at the end of every simulation run.

2.

During the creation of the simulation system the editing function is
hindered by the links between the blocks. While selecting a part of the
simulation, if the selected portion is within two grid squares of a link, the
model only selects the link instead of the whole selection area. It is not
possible to select and cut or select and copy a portion of the system if the
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user is close to the links. This is because even though the links are just
lines, they occupy much more than their volume.
3.

If the modeler is using a mouse with a scroll button and tries to select an
area with the scroll button the zoom setting of the whole systems resets to
3% automatically. This only happens if a blank place on the interface (a
place not including any blocks, nodes, etc.) is chosen.

4.

If the modeler tries to select an area including RBDs with the scroll button,
the software gives " The exception: Access Violation occurred in the
MODSIM Debugger" error. An attempt to continue after this error message
causes the program to shut down without any warning and without the
ability to save any necessary information. Right after the error message the
zoom on the interface also resets to 3%.

5.

While linking blocks and nodes at the bottom of the screen, if the mouse
cursor is close to the bottom edge, two more links appear with a 30° angle to
the original one protruding from the same origin. They tend to go down to
the bottom page without an end. These two extra links disappear when the
page is scrolled up or down.

6.

All other features including File (New, Open, Save, Save As, Simulate,
Print, Print Selection, Print Setup, Close, Exit), Edit (Add, Select All, Cut,
Copy, Paste, Clear, Details, Block Defaults, Mass Edit), Options (View
Tables, Pools, Phases, Preferences) and the sub-features of these features
work without any error. The sub-features under File are used during the
routine execution of simulation runs. The sub-features under Edit are used
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during the creation of the systems. The sub-features under options were
used during the creation of different systems. Tables were viewed at the end
of every simulation run. Pools were created in some of the system. The
phasing feature was used in the system with phasing. All options under
preferences are tested and they work correctly.
7.

The Help feature also works correctly but there is no help file in the model.
There is also no online help file available. This makes it hard and
unsatisfying in some cases. The phasing feature is a new addition to
RAPTOR 5.0. Even a modeler who is comfortable with the old versions
might need some help to fully understand all the special features about
phasing. It is definitely a must that a help file is included to the program.

8.

While minimizing the whole interface, the interface minimizes shifting
right. This makes the minimize, restore, and close buttons unreachable
unless the whole interface is dragged into viewable area of the monitor.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter is the final accreditation report for RAPTOR. The model results
must match the known results for the model to be accepted as credible. RAPTOR results
showed a precise resemblance to known results and therefore no statistical differences
were found between these results.

5.1 Verification and Validation Assessment of RAPTOR
The Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational Readiness
(RAPTOR) is an easily usable and important simulation modeling tool for reliability,
maintainability, and availability analysis of all AFOTEC systems. It has the ability to
help mitigate common operational test and evaluation problems such as high cost of
testing, inadequate time and resources. These are very important issues that need precise
and correct solutions. The only way to obtain these precise and correct results is to have
an accredited working simulation model. Otherwise operational ability of the Air Force
would be degraded and this would inversely influence the combat outcomes.
Verification and validation of the model assures the user or the accreditation
authority that the right model is built and it is working correctly. It would be very
assuring if the simulation model exactly replicated world results. Unfortunately this is
not a possible. Different comparison techniques were used in this thesis to show the
faithfulness of the simulation to known results. RAPTOR responded very well to all the
comparisons that were applied and proved to be an efficient, reliable, and accurate
simulation model.
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Since RAPTOR is a generic model, it has slower running characteristics. The
reason for this may be the enormous number of features. RAPTOR gives different type
of results related to the system including the minimum and maximum values and standard
deviation, more than that of other simulation models. The built-in animation feature is
another factor for the model to run slow, however, this feature is optional and can be
turned off during the runs.
Another issue for this thesis was developing a generic VV&A plan. The plan
used in this verification and validation effort can be applied to most simulation models.
However, the verification and the validation techniques used might differ from the ones
that are used in here. There are many techniques that exist which might be applicable to
specific type of simulations. The requirements or the implementation of the model will
dictate the suitable techniques to be used.

5.2 Recommendations
The overall performance of RAPTOR is very pleasing. No logical, numerical, or
behavioral errors were found. There were also no significant mathematical or statistical
errors present. However, there are still some more evaluation and improvements to be
done.
First of all, the model should be compared to real life system. It would be better
if this system is an Air Force system, which is already being used, because it would be
easy to get accurate data. The next thing to be checked is the code. The code of the
model was not checked in this effort because it required expertise in ModSim II
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Simulation language. There are also more than three hundred thousand lines of code.
The amount of time requirements for this job is beyond the limits of this research.
There are a few minor deficiencies in the general usability of the model. These
are addressed in Chapter 4 and the recommendations to fix these deficiencies were also
stated in the same chapter. These minor deficiencies have no effect on the overall system
performance. The upgrades would make RAPTOR more user-friendly and efficient.
The phasing feature was tested during the evaluations. However, since it is a new
add-in to RAPTOR 5.0, more testing focused directly on phasing must be accomplished
to show that all sub-features under phasing are working correctly. During the comparison
to a real life system, the agent should make sure that this feature is also used.

5.3 Final Thought
RAPTOR is a useful and necessary simulation tool for AFOTEC. It has been
upgraded over the past few years continually to make it more effective. After the
evaluations stated in the recommendations section are made, it can be accredited by the
accreditation authority. RAPTOR will enhance the test and evaluation capabilities of
AFOTEC.
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Appendices
it Log for Simple System Simulation

Starting Run 1
13.100823
43.236496
48.259814
54.730495
67.134390
81.328490
81.493527

Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,

100.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

120.135579
129.656798
153.964957
159.099825
174.396029
185.757239
195.597575

Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,

200.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

232.917202 a
234.734437 c
251.474548
255.197180
277.140191
292.279176

Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,

300.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

302.980969
312.896100
315.143100
327.004328
335.118602
348.067578
354.958730
363.638469
391.111842

Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,

b
d
b
d
c
a
d
d
a

400.000000 a

TimeOperated = 13.100823
RepairTime
= 0.135673
TimeOperated = 48.259814
TimeOperated = 54.730495
RepairTime
= 12.403896
TimeOperated = 14.194100
RepairTime
= 33.233712

TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime
RepairTime
TimeOperated
TimeOperated

RepairTime
RepairTime
TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime

TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime
TimeOperated
TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime

1 new spare(s) arrived
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= 76.899083
= 48.163272
= 3.829377
= 29.443027
= 93.067539
= 26.657414
= 41.632619

System = Yellow
System = Green
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red

System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Green
System = Red
System = Red

= 7.319627
System = Red
= 48.977198 System = Green
= 76.361136 System = Yellow
= 22.279978 System = Red
= 25.665643 System = Yellow
= 7.081996 System = Green

= 25.840778
= 138.500071
= 12.162131
= 14.108229
= 100.384165
= 55.788401
= 27.954402
= 8.679739
= 13.044265

System = Yellow
System = Red
System = Red
System = Green
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red

412.500839
420.670363
429.188476
431.837431
435.399391
475.725559

d
c
d
d
d
c

Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,

TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime
TimeOperated
RepairTime
TimeOperated

500.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

516.530907
517.534744
519.084376
533.511974
554.653730
556.665747
569.776261

Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,

d
a
c
d
c
a
c

TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime

600.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

661.010491 d
667.370584 d
672.788508 b

Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,

672.788508 b

***No spare in stock***

672.788508 b

spare ordered

686.355527 c
692.894162 c
693.653197 c

Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,

696.788508 b

ordered spare arrives

697.534107 b

Repaired,

700.000000 a

1 new spare:(s) arrived

712.368837
728.875698
738.888291
741.829283
750.462133
770.558213
772.302515
781.988140
792.468290

Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Repaired,

a
d
d
d
c
c
a
c
d

TimeOperated
RepairTime
TimeOperated

TimeOperated
RepairTime
TimeOperated

RepairTime

TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
TimeOperated
RepairTime
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime
RepairTime

800.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

852.819725
886.088493
889.848509
894.107067

Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,

a
a
c
d

900.000000 a

TimeOperated
RepairTime
TimeOperated
TimeOperated

1 new spare(s) arrived
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= 48.862370
= 85.551761
= 16.687636
= 2.648956
= 3.561960
= 55.055196

System = Red
System = Red
System = Green
System = Red
System = Green
System = Red

= 81.131516
= 126.422902
= 43.358817
= 16.981067
= 35.569354
= 9.131002
= 15.122531

System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Yellow
System = Red
System = Red
System = Green

= 127.498517 System = Red
System = Green
= 6.360093
= 168.883307 System = Yellow

= 116.579266 System = Red
System = Yellow
= 6.538635
= 0.759034
System = Red

= 0.745599

System = Red

= 155.70309
= 61.505114
= 10.012593
= 2.940992
= 56.808937
= 20.096080
= 29.933678
= 11.429927
= 50.639007

System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Green

System = Yellow
= 80.517210
System = Green
= 3.268768
= 107.860369 System = Red
= 101.638777 System = Red

922.602775
937.171252
937.979180
958.960850
970.803923
972.801281

Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,

972.801281 b

***No spare in stock***

972.801281 b

spare ordered

974.468993 a
988.946864 d
992.828837 a

Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,

996.801281 b

ordered spare arrives

RepairTime
TimeOperated
TimeOperated
RepairTime
RepairTime
TimeOperated

RepairTime
TimeOperated
TimeOperated

1000.000000 a

1 new spare(s) arrived

1000.000000 b
1000.000000 d

Partial Repair,
Partial Repair,

1000.000000

= 32.754266
= 14.568477
= 51.890687
= 21.789597
= 76.696856
= 99.377577

System == Red
System = Red
System == Red
System == Red
System == Yellow
System == Red

= 6.489814
= 18.142941
= 18.359843

System == Yellow
System == Red
System == Red

RepairTime = 3.198719
RepairTime = 11.053136

Simulation Terminated
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Appendix B. Event Log for Complex System Simulation

Starting Run 1
0.949713
12.403896
13.100823
14.827253
16.221828
17.227185
20.420450
29.905199
32.156125
34.464395
39.093210

block5
block8
blockl
block5
blockl2
blockl0
blockl
block9
block5
blockl3
block4

Failed,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Failed,
Failed,

TimeOperated =
TimeOperated =
TimeOperated =
RepairTime:
TimeOperated =
TimeOperated =
RepairTime:
TimeOperated =
TimeOperated =
TimeOperated=
TimeOperated =

0.949713
12.403896
13.100823
= 13.877540
16.221828
17.227185
= 7.319627
29.905199
17.328872
34.464395
39.093210

System
System
System
System
System
System
System
System
System
System
System

= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Yellow
= Red
= Red

39.093210 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

39.211099 block3
48.511384 blockl3

Failed,
TimeOperated = 39.211099 System = Red
Repaired,
RepairTime = 14.046989 System = Yellow

49.211099 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

55.793277
56.189852
60.873718
62.606925
65.875710
67.876565
69.367764
70.196822
71.288919
77.073156

Repaired,
RepairTime:
Failed,
TimeOperated =
Incremented, RepairTime =
Repaired,
RepairTime:
Repaired,
RepairTime =
Failed,
TimeOperated =
Repaired,
RepairTime:
Repaired,
RepairTime:
Repaired,
RepairTime:
Failed,
TimeOperated =

blockl2
blockl 1
Cspl
block4
blockl0
block2
block2
block9
block5
block4

77.073156 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

84.158415
87.741165
93.104771
98.866256
101.893634
104.268274
111.974849
122.523681
128.289313
129.655649
130.690406
130.748024
132.730388
140.276628

Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Repaired,
Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,

blockl
blockl2
blockl
blockl2
blockl2
blockl2
block4
blockl
blockl
blockl 1
blockl3
block9
blockl 3
block4

System = Yellow
= 39.571449
42.142863
11.662618
= 23.513714
= 48.648525
67.876565
= 1.491199
= 40.291623
= 39.132795
14.466231

System; = Yellow
System = = Yellow
System: = Yellow
System: = Yellow
System: = Yellow
System = = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow

TimeOperated = 63.737965 System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 31.947888 System = Yellow
RepairTime - = 8.946357
System == Yellow
RepairTime = = 11.125091 System = Yellow
System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 3.027378
System == Yellow
RepairTime = = 2.374640
RepairTime = = 34.901693 System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 29.418910 System = Yellow
System == Yellow
RepairTime = = 5.765632
RepairTime = = 73.465797 System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 82.179022 System = = Red
TimeOperated = 60.551202 System = = Red
System = Yellow
RepairTime: = 2.039983
TimeOperated = 28.301779 System = Yellow
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140.276628 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

141.243277 block7
144.900936 block3

Failed,
Failed,

154.900936 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

157.703389
168.528264
170.009709
178.464582
186.071039
186.697636
191.999543
192.492321
194.753415
196.990006

Failed,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,
Repaired,
Failed,

block2
blockl3
block2
blocklO
blockl3
blockl
blockl
block6
block9
blockl2

TimeOperated== 141.243277 System == Yellow
TimeOperated == 95.689837 System == Yellow
System = Yellow

TimeOperated = 88.335624 System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 35.797875 System = Red
RepairTime == 12.306320 System = Red
TimeOperated = 112.588871 System == Red
RepairTime == 17.542776 System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 58.408323
System == Yellow
RepairTime == 5.301907
System = Yellow
TimeOperated = 192.492321 System == Yellow
System == Yellow
RepairTime == 64.005391
TimeOperated = 92.721732
System == Yellow

197.492321 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System == Yellow

199.633283 block3
201.230068 blockl2

Failed,
TimeOperated = 44.732347
Repaired,
RepairTime == 4.240062

System == Yellow
System == Yellow

209.633283 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System == Yellow

211.811723
214.874106
215.407098
226.066571
226.386296
229.561487
230.778867
231.346997
233.447705

Failed,
TimeOperated = 19.812180
Repaired,
RepairTime == 3.062383
Repaired,
RepairTime == 64.163821
Failed,
TimeOperated == 11.192466
Repaired,
RepairTime == 0.319724
Repaired,
RepairTime == 217.157591
Incremented, RepairTime3= 75.877931
Repaired,
RepairTime == 91.070369
Failed,
TimeOperated == 2.100708

System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System = Yellow
System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System = Yellow

blockl
blockl
block7
blockl
blockl
block8
Cspl
block4
block4

233.447705 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

236.097712
237.074552
238.533383
239.574080

Incremented, RepairTime == 26.464429
Failed,
TimeOperated == 87.836144
Failed,
TimeOperated == 28.900100
Failed,
TimeOperated == 10.012593

Cspl
blockl 1
block3
block8

239.574080 block8

***No spare in stock***

239.574080 sp2

spare ordered

246.882504 blockl 1
247.546659 blockl 1

Repaired,
RepairTime == 9.807952
Failed,
TimeOperated == 0.664155

247.546659 blockl 1

***No spare in stock***

247.546659 sp2

spare ordered

248.533383 block3

Switched to a cold-standby
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System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System == Yellow
System == Yellow

System = Yellow
System == Yellow

System == Yellow

Incremented, RepairTime = 8.792035
Failed,
TimeOperated = 70.291559
Incremented, RepairTime = 77.352601
Failed,
TimeOperated = 92.036400
Repaired,
RepairTime = 112.104541

System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow

294.528721 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Yellow

300.407424 block5

Failed,

System = Yellow

300.407424 block5

***No spare in stock***

300.407424 sp2

spare ordered

300.561278
309.062425
316.307578
317.846050
321.108581
330.805293

Repaired,
RepairTime = 29.039651
Failed,
TimeOperated = 82.676129
Repaired,
RepairTime = 7.245153
Repaired,
RepairTime = 84.398345
Incremented, RepairTime = 26.579860
Failed,
TimeOperated = 12.959243

257.325418
271.521627
274.844922
289.528721
290.569123

Cspl
blockl2
Cspl
block6
blocklO

blockl2
blockl
blockl
block4
Cspl
block4

TimeOperated = 209.535746

System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow

330.805293 block*

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

335.177416 blockl
339.272568 block7

Failed,
Failed,

339.272568 block7

***No spare in stock***

340.225688 block9
342.609858 blockl
342.731891 blockl 0

Failed,
TimeOperated = 145.472273 System = Yellow
System = Yellow
Repaired,
RepairTime = 7.432442
System = Yellow
Failed, TimeOperated = 52.162768

342.731891 blocklO
365.494802 block2

***No spare in stock***
Failed,
TimeOperated = 195.485093

365.494802 block2

***No spare in stock***

404.114417 block9
408.022775 block9
408.062387 blockö

Repaired,
RepairTime = 63.888729
Failed,
TimeOperated = 3.908359
Failed,
TimeOperated = 113.533665

System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Red

413.062387 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Yellow

413.421094
418.287465
428.782128
433.162427
437.139872

System = Yellow
Incremented, RepairTime = 0.358707
System = Red
Failed,
TimeOperated = 75.677606
Repaired,
RepairTime = 10.494664 System = Yellow
Failed,
TimeOperated = 184.629044 System = Yellow
System = Red
Failed,
TimeOperated = 8.3 57744

Cspl
blockl
blockl
block3
blockl

TimeOperated = 18.869838
TimeOperated = 123.865470

System = Yellow
System = Yellow

System = Yellow

443.162427 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

444.395343 blockö

Failed,

System = Red

449.395343 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

TimeOperated = 31.332956
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System = Red

470.495704 blockl
480.309690 block3
488.250973 Cspl

Repaired,
RepairTime = 33.355832
Failed,
TimeOperated = 37.147262
Incremented, RepairTime = 38.855630

System = Yellow
System == Yellow
System = Yellow

490.309690 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Yellow

490.351339 Cspl
496.683398 Cspl

Incremented, RepairTime = 47.188911
Incremented, RepairTime = 6.373709

System = Yellow
System = Yellow

500.000000 spl

1 new spare(s) arrived

500.541502
501.002229
501.794259
505.086228

Failed,
TimeOperated = 314.470463
Failed,
TimeOperated = 30.506524
Repaired,
RepairTime = 0.792030
Failed,
TimeOperated = 204.524950

blockl 3
blockl
blockl
blockl2

System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red

505.086228 blockl2

***No spare in stock***

505.708930
514.058059
520.600167
540.262584

System == Red
Repaired,
RepairTime = 5.167428
Repaired,
RepairTime = 14.058059
System == Red
Repaired,
RepairTime = 189.794874 System == Red
Failed,
TimeOperated = 90.867241
System == Red

blockl3
blocklO
block4
block6

545.262584 block6
558.068913
567.871284
589.268101
596.761054
597.740353
602.953988

Cspl
blockl
block9
block3
block9
blockl

Switched to a cold-standby

System == Red

Incremented, RepairTime = 12.806329
Failed, TimeOperated = 66.077025
Repaired, RepairTime =181.245326
Failed, TimeOperated = 106.451364
Failed, TimeOperated = 8.472252
Repaired, RepairTime = 35.082704

System == Red
System == Red
System == Red
System == Red
System == Red
System:= Red

606.761054 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System -= Red

617.207908 block4

Failed, TimeOperated = 96.607741

System == Red

617.207908 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

619.695718 block4
647.630763 blocklO

Repaired, RepairTime = 2.487810
Failed, TimeOperated = 133.572704

647.630763 blocklO

***No spare in stock***

656.684868 block4

Failed,

656.684868 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

677.577245 block3
679.292885 blockl 3
681.821194 blockl 3

Failed, TimeOperated = 70.816191
Failed, TimeOperated = 173.583955
Repaired, RepairTime = 2.528308

System == Red
System == Red
System = Red

687.577245 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System == Red

702.026660 blockl
716.309152 block3
724.836217 block9

Failed, TimeOperated = 99.072672
Failed, TimeOperated = 28.731907
Repaired, RepairTime = 127.095864

System == Red
System == Red
System == Red

TimeOperated = 36.989150
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System:= Red
System == Red

System == Red

726.309152 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

730.210666
731.863644
733.088233
734.579113

Failed,
TimeOperated == 5.374448
Repaired,
RepairTime == 29.836984
Failed,
TimeOperated == 6.779081
Failed,
TimeOperated == 189.316529

System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red

739.579113 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

742.581216 Cspl

Incremented, RepairTime == 16.272063

System = Red

743.088233 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

746.824378
752.460606
754.157292
761.750003
762.204427

Incremented, RepairTime == 3.736145
Failed,
TimeOperated == 20.596962
Repaired,
RepairTime == 1.696685
Repaired,
RepairTime == 105.065135
Failed,
TimeOperated == 0.454425

System = Red
System = Red
System == Red
System == Red
System = Red

block9
blockl
block3
block6

Cspl
blockl
blockl
block4
block4

System = Red

762.204427 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

763.520971 block6
767.107049 Cspl

Failed,
TimeOperated == 23.941858
Incremented, RepairTime == 79.529804

System == Red
System == Red

768.520971 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System == Red

768.633012
771.730830
779.622018
783.151028

Incremented, RepairTime == 0.112041
Failed,
TimeOperated == 17.573539
Repaired,
RepairTime == 7.891187
Failed,
TimeOperated == 40.062795

System = Red
System == Red
System == Red
System = Red

793.151028 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

794.960127
796.654737
796.865425
812.788858
819.089579
835.198979
836.538965
848.489064
854.745515
865.632119
867.132838

Incremented, RepairTime = 55.381014
Failed,
TimeOperated = 17.032720
Repaired,
RepairTime = 0.210688
Incremented, RepairTime = 206.027804
Repaired,
RepairTime = 56.885151
Failed,
TimeOperated = 153.377785
Repaired,
RepairTime = 1.339986
Repaired,
RepairTime = 118.278398
Failed,
TimeOperated = 6.256451
Failed,
TimeOperated = 97.111148
Failed,
TimeOperated = 48.043259

System == Red
System == Red
System == Red
System == Red
System == Red
System = Red
System == Red
System == Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red

Cspl
blockl
blockl
block3

Cspl
blockl
blockl
Cspl
block4
blockl3
blockl3
block9
block9
block6
block4

867.132838 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)

870.632119 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System == Red

880.912656 block4
884.688694 block3
891.881636 block4

Repaired,
RepairTime =-13.779818
Failed,
TimeOperated = 91.537666
Failed,
TimeOperated = 10.968980

System == Red
System == Red
System == Red

891.881636 block4

Obtained 1 Resource(s)
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893.717018 Cspl

Incremented, RepairTime = 23.084899

System = Red

894.688694 block3

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

895.261121 Cspl
900.869904 block6

Incremented, RepairTime = 0.572427
Failed,
TimeOperated = 30.237785

System = Red
System = Red

905.869904 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

906.180017 block6
909.680318 blockl3

Failed,
Failed,

System = Red
System = Red

911.180017 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

913.235788
914.451663
931.888298
943.150477
957.716703
968.046458
969.873181
970.803208
971.887454

Incremented, RepairTime = 2.055771
Repaired,
RepairTime = 4.771345
Incremented, RepairTime = 138.737270
Incremented, RepairTime = 37.280573
Failed,
TimeOperated = 160.851278
Failed,
TimeOperated = 56.866441
Failed,
TimeOperated = 55.421518
Repaired,
RepairTime = 13.086505
Repaired,
RepairTime = 2.014272

System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = Red

973.046458 block6

Switched to a cold-standby

System = Red

977.219607 block4

Repaired,

System = Red

1000.000000 spl

1 new spare(s) arrived

1000.000000 block6
1000.000000 block6
1000.000000 block7
1000.000000 block9

Partial Repair, RepairTime = 26.953 542
Cold spare partial repair cost not calculated
Partial Repair, RepairTime = 0.000000
Partial Repair, RepairTime = 145.254485

Cspl
blockB
Cspl
Cspl
blockl
blockö
blockl3
blockl
blockl3

1000.000000

TimeOperated = 0.310113
TimeOperated = 73.141352

RepairTime = 85.337971

Simulation Terminated
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Appendix C. Event Log for Phasing Simulation

Starting Run 1
0.407020
7.278235
24.925284
26.425121
27.365247
30.162384
33.955898
48.038406
55.135456
60.217418
66.966167
67.876565
83.938548
85.103750

block5
blockl
block7
blockl
block4
block3
block7
block4
block4
block5
block3
block2
block7
block2

Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime

100.000000 System

Changing to Phase 2

102.760579
126.094064
128.328214
142.071284
143.422936
156.475432
175.115419
177.481264
191.678349

Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Repaired, RepairTime

block7
block5
block6
blockl
block5
blockö
block6
blockl
block6

200.000000 sparespool

= 0.407020
= 7.278235
= 24.925284
= 19.146886
= 27.365247
= 30.162384
= 9.030613
= 20.673159
= 7.097050
= 59.810398
= 36.803783
= 67.876565
= 49.982651
= 17.227185

System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Red
System = = Red
System = Red
System = Red
System = : Yellow
System = : Yellow
System = Yellow
System = : Yellow
System = : Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Red
System = Red

=18.822031
=65.876646
=128.328214
=115.646163
=17.328872
=28.147218
=18.639987
=35.409980
=16.562930

System = Yellow
System = : Yellow
System: : Yellow
System= = Red
System = Red
System = Yellow
System = = Red
System = Yellow
System = Yellow

1 new spare(s) arrived

200.000000 System

Changing to Phase 3

210.248021 block4
279.498057 block4

Repaired, RepairTime =155.112565
Failed, TimeOperated =69.250035

300.000000 System

Changing to Phase 4

303.011771
310.788139
316.988972
331.455203
355.886388
383.699116
385.023593
390.960194

Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime
Failed, TimeOperated
Repaired, RepairTime

block4
block5
block4
block4
block4
block4
block4
block4

=23.513714
=167.365203
=13.977201
=14.466231
=24.431185
=27.812727
=1.324478
=5.936601
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System = Green
System = Yellow

System = = Green
System: = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = : Yellow
System = Yellow
System = = Yellow

400.000000 sparespool

1 new spare(s) arrived

400.000000 System

Changing to Phase 5

409.117063
431.525952
459.827731
500.000000

block5
block4
block4
System

Repaired, RepairTime =98.328924
Failed, TimeOperated =40.565758
Repaired, RepairTime =28.301779
Changing to Phase 6

System = Green
System = Yellow
System = Green

523.576989
534.177144
564.929701
581.617356
583.087852
583.087852

block4
block4
block4
block4
block4
block4

Failed, TimeOperated =63.749258
Repaired, RepairTime =10.600155
Failed, TimeOperated =30.752557
Repaired, RepairTime =16.687655
Failed, TimeOperated =1.470496
***No spare in stock***

System = Yellow
System = Green
System = Yellow
System = Green
System = Yellow

600.000000 sparespool

1 new spare(s) arrived

600.000000 System

Changing to Phase 7

684.398345 block4

Repaired,

700.000000 System

Changing to Phase 8

735.217733 block4
735.217733 block4

Failed, TimeOperated =50.819388
***No spare in stock***

800.000000 sparespool

RepairTime =84.398345

Changing to Phase 9

900.000000 System

Changing to Phase 10

927.828094
936.899564
936.899564
960.823375
997.476830

Repaired, RepairTime =127.828094
Failed, TimeOperated =9.071470
***No spare in stock***
Failed, TimeOperated =769.145026
Repaired, RepairTime =36.653455

1000.000000 sparespool
1000.000000 block4

1000.000000

System = Yellow

1 new spare(s) arrived

800.000000 System

block4
block4
block4
block6
block6

System = Green

1 new spare(s) arrived
Partial Repair,

RepairTime=0.000000

Simulation Terminated
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System = Green
System = Yellow
System = Yellow
System = Yellow

Appendix D. End of Run Report for Comp3 Simulation

End of Run #1
Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 6
Number of component failures = 64
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

162.096243

28.309332

306.189571

98.942155

Down Times

4.570424

1.067708

8.953001

2.695389

Total Time Between
Component Failures

15.537531

0.344740

54.381696

11.615070

Component Repair Times 11.998220

3.689210

29.079950

6.418175

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.972577457
= 15.196523
= 40.587278%
= 56.670468%
= 2.742254%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
1.00
916.55
83.45
8.00
1.00
798.30 201.70
10.00
1.00
910.12
89.88
12.00
1.00
926.09
73.91
15.00
1.00
820.55 179.45
12.00
1.00
945.32
54.68
3.00
1.00 921.58
78.42
4.00

Block Totals

7.00

6238.51

761.49

64.00

Grand Total

End of Run #2
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7071.00

Total
1009.00
1011.00
1013.00
1016.00
1013.00
1004.00
1005.00
7071.00

St.Dev

Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 9
Number of component failures = 74
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

103.860910

21.068148

314.622511

88.340325

Down Times

7.250201

1.485426

12.115139

3.569893

Total Time Between
Component Failures

12.911986

0.398413

38.128766

9.613922

Component Repair Times 12.012773

3.995005

25.908401

6.183710

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

=0.934748188
=12.631732
= 33.962320%
=59.512499%
=6.525181%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Block Totals

7.00

OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
906.33
93.67
8.00
815.11
184.89
9.00
860.23
139.77
17.00
902.72
97.28
18.00
821.41
178.59
13.00
855.33
144.67
7.00
949.91
50.09
2.00
6111.05

888.95

74.00

Grand Total

Total
1009.00
1010.00
1018.00
1019.00
1014.00
1008.00
1003.00
7081.00

7081.00

***********************************************************

End of Run #3
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 7
Number of component failures = 76
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

138.433886

17.609651

161.085223

50.304496

Down Times

4.423257

0.318296

8.282756

2.631559

Total Time Between
Component Failures

12.977218

0.091552

58.077537

11.896779

Component Repair Times 11.747400

3.163824

29.853451

7.465307

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.969037201
= 12.750489
= 36.683760%
= 60.219960%
= 3.096280%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
1.00
883.05
116.95
11.00
1.00
889.31
110.69
6.00
1.00
906.21
93.79
13.00
1.00
898.65
101.35
22.00
1.00
866.17
133.83
10.00
1.00
878.26
121.74
6.00
1.00
785.54
214.46
8.00

Block Totals

7.00

6107.20

892.80

76.00

Grand Total

Total
1012.00
1007.00
1014.00
1023.00
1011.00
1007.00
1009.00
7083.00

7083.00

**$$$*%**$$$**$******************************##*****#**************

End of Run #4
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures =10
Number of component failures = 72
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

94.315696

0.956191

175.971563

63.936751

Down Times

5.684304

0.918555

10.768905

2.829054

Total Time Between
Component Failures

13.751471

0.069562

56.287808

12.268698

Component Repair Times 13.786441

3.719212

28.769461

6.496083

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.943156964
= 13.099402
= 32.493553%
=61.822143%
= 5.684304%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Block Totals

7.00

OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
842.90
157.10
16.00
883.31
116.69
6.00
920.59
79.41
10.00
955.53
44.47
9.00
776.73
223.27
14.00
837.99
162.01
8.00
790.33
209.67
9.00

Total
1017.00
1007.00
1011.00
1010.00
1015.00
1009.00
1010.00

6007.38

7079.00

992.62

72.00

Grand Total

7079.00

*******************************************************************

End of Run #5
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 8
Number of component failures = 76
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

119.803204

1.341078

266.142503

103.758315

5.196796

1.422675

11.275502

3.071265

12.899445

0.211473

72.523181

13.322223

Component Repair Times 11.760887

3.404244

23.579041

5.831966

Time Between
Downing Events
Down Times
Total Time Between
Component Failures

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

=0.958425631
= 12.610864
= 35.291434%
= 60.551130%
=4.157437%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Block Totals

7.00

OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
855.49
144.51
15.00
858.14
141.86
7.00
889.39
110.61
14.00
931.00
69.00
14.00
790.08
209.92
15.00
827.20
172.80
9.00
954.87
45.13
2.00

Total
1016.00
1008.00
1015.00
1015.00
1016.00
1010.00
1003.00

6106.17

7083.00

893.83

76.00

Grand Total

End of Run #6
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7083.00

r

Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 8
Number of component failures = 68
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

115.857973

5.721780

550.820778

170.616769

9.142027

0.260558

18.133364

5.990827

14.705756

0.101464

61.234672

13.777678

Component Repair Times 13.413348

3.623280

29.521524

6.754815

Time Between
Downing Events
Down Times
Total Time Between
Component Failures

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

StDev

= 0.926863784
= 13.630350
=41.623129%
= 51.063249%
= 7.313622%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
1.00
888.33
111.67
11.00
1.00
802.25
197.75
11.00
1.00
913.54
86.46
12.00
1.00
947.51
52.49
11.00
1.00
809.15
190.85
12.00
1.00
876.66
123.34
6.00
1.00
874.73
125.27
5.00

Block Totals

7.00

6112.18

887.82

68.00

Grand Total

Total
1012.00
1012.00
1013.00
1012.00
1013.00
1007.00
1006.00
7075.00

7075.00

*******************************************************************

End of Run #7
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 12
Number of component failures = 79
Minimum

Maximum

St.Dev

78.320361

1.372250

237.603831

71.580889

5.012972

0.677053

17.199420

4.324360

12.629687

0.000547

109.502728

5.499127

Component Repair Times 11.244902

2.693152

35.713809

6.843903

Mean
Time Between
Downing Events
Down Times
Total Time Between
Component Failures

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.939844337
= 11.896764
= 44.738310%
= 49.246124%
= 6.015566%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Block Totals

7.00

OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
12.00
888.67
111.33
10.00
806.13
193.87
20.00
837.37
162.63
21.00
101.65
898.35
5.00
924.10
75.90
834.82
165.18
8.00
3.00
921.15
78.85
6110.59

889.41

79.00

Grand Total

Total
1013.00
1011.00
1021.00
1022.00
1006.00
1009.00
1004.00
7086.00

7086.00

*******************************************************************

End of Run #8
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 8
Number of component failures = 73
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

119.833343

20.269835

373.362701

109.031475

Down Times

5.166657

1.284684

14.271899

3.901198

Total Time Between
Component Failures

13.605911

0.377931

51.023985

10.194772

Component Repair Times 11.604847

3.681945

26.672368

6.292389

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.958666740
= 13.132421
=38.589838%
= 57.276836%
=4.133326%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost
1.00
908.08
91.92
9.00
1.00
824.07
175.93
9.00
1.00
850.42
149.58
19.00
1.00
906.69
93.31
18.00
1.00
874.50
125.50
8.00
1.00
888.59
111.41
6.00
1.00
905.33
94.67
4.00

Block Totals

7.00

6157.68

842.32

73.00

Grand Total

Total
1010.00
1010.00
1020.00
1019.00
1009.00
1007.00
1005.00
7080.00

7080.00

*******************************************************************

End of Run #9
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 9
Number of component failures = 69
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

106.345797

3.090816

187.997467

70.402540

4.765315

0.524584

15.584759

4.469667

14.335319

0.131159

45.606254

10.461154

Component Repair Times 13.644101

4.101679

34.032733

7.110441

Time Between
Downing Events
Down Times
Total Time Between
Component Failures

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

=0.957112168
=13.871191
= 31.946697%
= 63.764520%
= 4.288783%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Block Totals

7.00

OpCost RepCost
863.76
136.24
900.59
99.41
836.19
163.81
955.47
44.53
871.49
128.51
862.91
137.09
768.16
231.84
6058.56

IndvSpCost
12.00
5.00
19.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
9.00

941.44

69.00

Grand Total
$;|c;i:$:{i;{<;fc$$;{e:fc$$$$$;i;$$$$;fi;|c$$$$$j|e)|e$^

End of Run #10
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7076.00

Total
1013.00
1006.00
1020.00
1010.00
1009.00
1008.00
1010.00
7076.00

Ending SimTime= 1000.000000
Number of system failures = 9
Number of component failures = 77
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

StDev

104.503123

0.401614

254.487800

84.983994

Down Times

6.607988

1.373503

19.198188

5.164669

Total Time Between
Component Failures

12.932849

0.089354

46.210190

11.484511

Component Repair Times 12.742949

3.687013

34.604066

6.830859

IndvSpCost
11.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
9.00
10.00
2.00

Total
1012.00
1015.00
1016.00
1017.00
1010.00
1011.00
1003.00

Time Between
Downing Events

Availability
MTBM
GreenTime
YellowTime
RedTime

= 0.940528110
= 12.214651
= 34.773866%
= 59.278945%
= 5.947189%

Cost Data
Block
1
2
5
3
4
6
7

InitCost
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Block Totals

7.00

OpCost RepCost
885.83
114.17
731.16
268.84
886.37
113.63
919.71
80.29
858.83
141.17
809.69
190.31
943.20
56.80
6034.78

965.22

77.00

Grand Total
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7084.00

7084.00
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